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Abstract
This Article investigates how the European Court of Human Rights becomes com-
petent to make decisions in cases concerning (or taking roots in) “historical situations” 
preceding the ratiﬁ cation of the European Convention by a given Member State or even 
the enactment of the Convention. “Historical situations” refer to events that occurred in 
the period of Second World War or shortly thereafter. In all such cases, the preliminary 
question arises whether the Court is competent temporally (ratione temporis) to deal 
with the application. This group of cases concerned usually allegations touching upon 
the right to life and the right to property. The Court had to decide if the allegation 
in question related to a temporally closed event (making the Court not competent) 
or rather to a continuous violation (where the Court could adjudicate). A speciﬁ c 
set of legal questions arose vis-à-vis the right to life, ﬁ rst of all that of the autonomy 
of the procedural obligation to conduct an eﬃ  cient investigation. The Strasbourg case 
law did not provide a clear answer. However, following two crucial judgements rendered 
by the Grand Chamber, the Court has established an interesting legal framework. Arti-
cle analyses also two other situations having a historical dimension: bringing to justice 
those accused of war crimes or other crimes under international law (in light of the 
alleged conﬂ ict with the principle of nullum crimes sine lege) and pursuing authors 
of pro-Nazi statements or speech denying the reality of Nazi atrocities.
Complaints concerning situations which took place before a given country 
ratiﬁ ed the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
the “Convention”) have found their way, and continue to ﬁ nd their way, onto the 
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docket of both the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (hereinafter 
interchangeably the “Court” or “ECHR”) as well as the earlier European Commis-
sion on Human Rights (hereinafter usually “Commission”).1 In such cases, one of 
the preliminary questions which arises concerns the ratione temporis competence 
of the Court/Commission. Both the Court and Commission have attempted to de-
lineate the criteria upon which they decide whether a given complaint (also some-
times referred to as an application) is timely and justiciable, or barred as untimely. 
Questions and issues related to the timeliness of complaints will be exam-
ined in the ﬁ rst part of this work. These questions usually arise in connection 
with violations of the right to life (Article 2) or the right to property (Article 1, 
Protocol no. 1). It has sometimes happened that complainants have accused the 
State (in its own right or through individuals or agencies acting on its behalf) of 
being directly liable for taking of life or property in violation of the provisions of 
the Convention.  However, more often the State, as a Party to the Convention, 
is accused of failure to react appropriately to a death or homicide or illegal dep-
rivation of property via its alleged failure to conduct an eﬀ ective investigation 
or prosecution, failure to apprehend those responsible, or failure to provide ap-
propriate legal remedies. In order for the Court or Commission to review accusa-
tions against a State arising out of events which took place before the Convention 
entered into force on the territory of said State, it had to establish a set of criteria 
which would justify its jurisdiction over cases arising from so-called “historical 
situations”, understood, for the purposes of this work, as situations arising out of 
events during the World War II and the years immediately following its end.
In addition to the issues of timeliness, which are dealt with in this work, 
two other legal issues are examined. The ﬁ rst concerns the eﬀ orts made, by States 
party to the Convention, to apprehend and hold accountable the perpetrators 
of “historical crimes”. In those complaints lodged in the Court or Commission 
by complainants found guilty in national courts, their ﬁ rst line of defence is al-
ways that there is no legal basis for prosecuting them for their acts. Such prosecu-
tions were, in the arguments of such complainants, a violation of the principle 
nullum crimes sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, and hence a violation of Article 7 
of the Convention. A second problem relates to the approach of the Commis-
sion and the Tribunal to the validity and proportionality of domestic sanctions 
1 Prior to the entry into force of Protocol no. 11 (1 November 1998), which 
reformed the Strasbourg application procedures, the Commission preliminarily handled all 
complaints and issued an admissibility decision (décision sur la recevabilité) regarding each 
complaint. (In fact the Commission continued to act for another year after the Protocol 
no. 11 came into effect, ﬁ nishing the work it had started). 
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imposed for violating laws prohibiting the public denial of certain historical facts. 
One may argue in such cases a violation of freedom of expression protected by 
Article 10 of the Convention. In the latter instances, the cases before the Court 
or Commission usually concern the verdicts of national courts (more rarely, 
other national institutions) for making pro-Nazi statements or negating the 
existence of certain war crimes, the Holocaust, or the existence of concentration 
camps and/or gas chambers. 
I. So far, no cases have been placed on the Strasbourg docket concerning acts com-
mitted by a State during World War II which could be qualiﬁ ed as violations of 
Article 2 of the Convention.2 There would appear to be four principal reasons for 
this. Firstly, the Convention was created (signed on 4 November 1950) and came 
into eﬀ ect (on 3 September 1953), after World War II. This means that the Con-
vention could not be, prima facie, applied, in accordance with the norm of inter-
national law prohibiting the retroactive application of laws.3 Secondly, acts com-
mitted during the World War II, which constituted violations of the right to life, 
were actively pursued and prosecuted, and those found responsible were tried and 
punished, often quite severely. Thirdly, during the ﬁ rst two decades after the Con-
vention entered into force, its regime was in statu nascendi. In reality, the so-called 
“formative period” associated with the creation of the fundamental doctrines of the 
Convention and their application, which was closely intertwined with the emerging 
jurisprudence of the Commission and the Court, only occurred during the 1970s, 
and in some cases only in the 1980s.4 In addition, the control mechanisms aimed 
to ensure observance of the Convention were diﬀ erent at that time than they are 
today. A uniform system of control, equally applicable to State-Parties to the Con-
vention and based on permanent, year-round Court oversight and sessions, only 
came into being with the entry into force of Protocol no. 11 on 1 November 1998.5 
2 Allegations of crimes against humanity, even genocide, have been episodically al-
leged in order to provide the Court with ratione temporis competence in cases primarily con-
cerning the deprivation of property rights of displaced or resettled Germans (often referred 
to by the Germans as expulsion): Bergauer and 89 others v. Czech Republic (application no. 
17120/04, decision of 13 December 2005, unpublished) and Preussische Treuhand GmbH 
and Co. KG A.A. v. Poland (application no. 47550/06, decision of 7 October 2008). 
3  See Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969.
4 See, for example H.C. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynam-
ics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Dordrecht: 1996, 
Chs. 1 and 2. 
5  For more on the topic of the control mechanisms introduced by Protocol no. 11, see
B. Gronowska, Reforma procedury kontrolnej Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka z 1950 r. 
– wybrane zagadnienia [Reforming the control procedures of the European Convention 
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Finally, recognition of the particular responsibilities arising from Article 2 of the 
Convention, and in particular – what is important when determining the ratione 
temporis competence of the Court and the Commission – the procedural obliga-
tions upon State-Parties arising therefrom, only appeared in the Court’s decisions 
in the 1990s. 
In the Court’s most recent decisions, the question has arisen several times 
whether the principle of ratione temporis is applicable to situations whereby 
a State is accused of taking life or causing death by actions which took place before 
such a State became a Party to the Convention. In contrast to decisions involving 
allegations of the illegal deprivation of property, the Court’s verdicts regarding 
deprivation of life have not formulated with any precision the Convention prin-
ciples to be applied, which has led to signiﬁ cant contradictions and discrepancies 
in its jurisprudence.
The issues of timeliness have arisen, for all practical purposes, in relation 
to the new Member States of the Council of Europe, i.e. those which joined the 
Council and ratiﬁ ed the Convention after 1990, and have concerned relatively 
recent acts which, however, took place prior to the time an accused State rati-
ﬁ ed the Convention. At the time these cases arose, the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
(used hereinafter to refer to the combined decisions of both the Commission and 
Court) already had established the diﬀ erence between the substantive and proce-
dural aspects of Article 2, upon which the complainants relied.
The substantive aspect of Article 2 is the eﬀ ective protection of human life. 
Above all, this prohibits States (or their organs or persons acting on the State’s 
behalf) to take human life, with the exception of speciﬁ c circumstances which 
are enumerated in a closed fashion in Paragraph 2 of Article 2 (in defence of any 
person from unlawful violence; in order to eﬀ ect a lawful arrest or to prevent the 
escape of a person lawfully detained; in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection).6 This aspect of Article 2 is thus directly connected 
to an act of killing or causing death.
of Human Rights of 1950 – selected issues], Przegląd Prawa Europejskiego 1996, no. l; 
A. Drzemczewski, The European Human Rights Convention: a New Court of Human Rights 
as of November l, 1998, 55(3) Washington and Lee Law Review 697 (1998); H.G. Scherm-
ers, The Eleventh Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, 19 European Law 
Review 367 (1994).
6 These “permissible circumstances” are subject to strict interpretation, and any 
allegation of such circumstances and the consequences thereof are subject to rigorous veri-
ﬁ cation by the Court (e.g. Avşar v. Turkey, application no. 25657/94, judgement of 10 July 
2001, ECHR 2001-VII, para. 391).
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There is no doubt that an act of killing or causing death needs to be treated 
as a single, instantaneous act (acte instantané), not as an act which creates a situ-
ation of a continuing violation (une situation de violation continue). As a result the 
Court is without competence to issue a judgement based on the substantive aspect 
of Article 2 if a death took place before a State-Party ratiﬁ ed the Convention.7 
In addition to the substantive aspect of Article 2, the Court has also identi-
ﬁ ed its procedural aspect. The Article 2 providing that “(e)veryone’s right to life 
shall be protected by law” – when read in conjunction with Article 1 that “The 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms deﬁ ned in Section I of this Convention” – requires the State 
to undertake “some form of eﬀ ective oﬃ  cial investigation” when individuals were 
intentionally killed or when the circumstances of a death (and the responsibi-
lity for this death) are unclear.8 A State-Party’s obligation to comply with proce-
dural prescriptions have been analysed by the Court separately from its obliga-
tion not to violate substantive principles. This can lead to a situation whereby 
a State is deemed to have violated the procedural obligations of Article 2, without 
however violating its substantive principles.9 This separate treatment of these two 
aspects of Article 2 is justiﬁ ed. Very often a State may not be ascribed with guilt for 
7 See e.g., Varnava and others v. Turkey, applications nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 
16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, judge-
ment of 10 January 2008, para. 109; Ivanova v. Russia, application no. 74705/01, decision of 
1 April 2004 (unpubl.); Bilgin v. Turkey, application no. 26147/95, decision of 4 September 
1996 (unpubl.); Jackiewicz v. Poland, application no. 23980/94, decision of 18 October 1995 
(unpubl.); Walewska v. Poland, application no. 36424/97, decision of 9 September 1998 
(unpubl.).
8 E.g., McCann and others v. United Kingdom, application no. 18984/91, judgement 
of 27 September 1995 (Grand Chamber), Series A.324, para. 161; Ergi v. Turkey, appli-
cation no.  23818/94, judgement of 28 July 1998, RJD 1998-IV, para. 82; Mastromatteo 
v. Italy, application no.  37703/97, judgement of 24 October 2002 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 
2002-VIII, para. 89; Assenov and others v. Bulgaria, application no. 24760/94, judgement 
of 28 October 1998, RJD 1998-VIII, paras. 101-106.
9 E.g., Kaya v. Turkey, application no. 22729/93, judgement of 19 February 1998, 
RJD 1998-I, paras. 74-78 and 86-92; McKerr v. United Kingdom, application no. 28883/95, 
judgement of 4 May 2001, ECHR 2001-III, paras. 116-61; Scavuzzo-Hager and others v. Swit-
zerland, application no. 41773/98, judgement of 7 February 2006 (unpubl.), paras. 53-69 
and 80-86; Ramsahai and others v. Holland, application no. 52391/99, judgement of 15 May 
2007 (Grand Chamber), paras. 286-89 and 323-57. The autonomy of the procedural issues 
makes it possible to allege solely a lack of effective investigation. So it was in, among others, 
Calvelli and Ciglio, application no. 32967/96, judgement of 17 January 2002 (Grand Cham-
ber), ECHR 2002-I, paras. 41-57; Byrzykowski v. Poland, application no. 11562/05, judge-
ment of 27 June 2006 (unpubl.), paras. 86 and 94-118; Brecknell v. United Kingdom, applica-
tion no. 32457/04, judgement of 27 November 2007 (unpubl.), para. 53.
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an individual death, but its failure to provide appropriate measures or procedures 
(or to initiate them if provided for) aimed at investigating the causes of and cir-
cumstances surrounding a death may justify ﬁ nding a violation by said State of 
Article 2 of the Convention.
The question arises, within what time frame relative to the entry into force 
of the Convention in the territory of a State-Party, must the procedural obliga-
tions be put into force? Two model solutions can be identiﬁ ed. In the ﬁ rst, the 
procedural and substantive aspects of Article 2 are both treated the same. In other 
words, if a death occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention, no pro-
cedural obligations concerning the death can be imposed on a State not yet party 
to the Convention, since to do so would have the same eﬀ ect as making the State 
responsible for the death, an outcome which would lie outside the Court’s ratione 
temporis competence with regard to the provisions of Article 2 in their entirety. 
The second possible model would separate the procedural and substantive aspects 
of Article 2. Although the Court would not be competent to adjudicate on whe-
ther the deprivation of life violated Article 2 in its substantive aspect with regard 
to deaths occurring before the Convention was in force, it would however be able 
to assess whether a State-Party fulﬁ lled its autonomous procedural obligations 
with regard to the death after the State became a party to the Convention. In such 
a case it would be necessary to delineate the criteria to be applied in determining 
the existence of procedural obligation.
II. In its ﬁ rst decision regarding the two aspects of Article 2, the Court chose the 
ﬁ rst solution, i.e. linking the two aspects with regard to the question of timeli-
ness. This occurred in the combined case of Moldovan and others as well as Rostaş 
and others v. Romania.10 These proceedings concerned a pogrom which took place 
on 20 September 1993, and which resulted in the deaths of three Roma and acts 
of arson against the houses of a large number of Roma. The events occurred be-
fore the Convention went into eﬀ ect in Romania (20 June 1994). The Court, 
commenting on the admissibility of the allegations of violation of Article 2, is-
sued a short opinion stating that, in accordance with recognised principles of in-
ternational law, the Convention could only be applied to facts and events which 
took place after its entry into force on the territory of a Party-State. Inasmuch as 
the State’s responsibility to undertake an eﬀ ective investigation of any alleged 
violation and to provide eﬀ ective sanctions against the perpetrators of such vio-
lations is inextricably bound up with the events themselves – events which fall 
10 Application no.s 41138/98 and 64321/01, decided (partially) on 13 March 2001 
(unpubl.).
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outside the Court’s ratione temporis competence – then the judges of the Court 
are similarly without competence to examine allegations of procedural violations 
of Article 2 arising from such events.11 
The formalistic approach laid down in the Rostaş case appeared to be sof-
tened somewhat by dicta contained in the Court’s subsequent decision in Voro-
shilov v. Russia.12 That case concerned the alleged violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention, which prohibits “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.” Once again, the “substantive act” occurred prior to the entry into 
force in Russia of the Convention, and the complainant alleged the lack of subse-
quent eﬀ ective proceedings aimed at identifying and punishing the perpetrators 
(alleged to be policemen). In describing its lack of ratione temporis competence, 
the Court stated that it could not verify whether the complainant made “credible 
assertions” concerning his injuries, the circumstances surrounding them, and the 
perpetrators. Initially, Russian policemen were charged with criminal oﬀ enses, but 
the Russian courts determined that Voroshilov might have incurred his injuries 
not during his questioning, but in his jail cell. The ECHR’s formulation seemed 
to suggest that if Voroshilov’s alleged facts had been veriﬁ ed, and if he could have 
demonstrated that the Russian authorities did not make eﬀ orts to apprehend and 
punish the perpetrators, then the Court might have determined it was competent 
to hear the case. In other words, competent national institutions (courts) would 
have not applied national law to established facts.13
However, cases based on a lack of eﬀ ort to apprehend and punish perpetra-
tors seem to require proof of the identity of the perpetrators and knowledge of the 
surrounding circumstances, which in practice is usually quite unlikely. Even in 
cases of politicized and corrupt legal regimes, it is far more likely that certain 
11 The Court did however agree to review allegations concerning events which took 
place following the entry into force of the Convention (ﬁ nal decision of 3 March 2003 (un-
publ.)), indicating the following violations of Convention provisions: Article 3 (the provi-
sion concerning “degrading treatment”); Article 6 (Right to a fair trial); Article 8 (Right 
to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination). In its 
judgement the Court found that these provisions were violated and granted the seven com-
plainants EUR 238,000 in material damages (judgement of 12 July 2005, ECHR 2005−VII). 
A group of 18 other complainants reached an agreement with the Romanian authorities 
(which agreed to pay 262,000 Euro in damages), which agreement was conﬁ rmed by Court 
judgement (from 5 July 2005, (unpubl.)).
12 Application no. 21501/02, decision of 8 December 2005 (unpubl.).
13 It would appear that an analogical reasoning to the Voroshilov case, and use of the 
same formulation (credible assertions) was used by judges Nicolas Bratza i Rıza Türmen in 
their separate opinion (pt. 6) attached to the judgement in Šilih v. Slovenia (Grand Cham-
ber), which is further discussed in detail in this article. 
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versions of events will be simply questioned, rather than accepted, but without 
drawing proper legal consequences. Nonetheless the casus of Voroshilov (in the 
sense of either made or possible distinctions) could be applied to “historical situa-
tions” where the circumstances surrounding a particular crime and the identity of 
the perpetrators is established, but the national court, rather than classifying such a 
crime as an international law crime, treated it as an “ordinary” criminal oﬀ ense.14 
The argumentation which the Court outlined in the Moldovan and Voroshilov 
cases was repeated in its Kholodov v. Russia decision, which concerned the much-
publicised murder of a well-known journalist of the “Moscow Komsomolec”.15 
The Court’s approach in the above-mentioned cases, and its ﬁ nding that it 
lacked ratione temporis competence, seemed to be conﬁ rmed by the 8 March 2006 
verdict of the Grand Chamber in the case of Blečić v. Croatia, which concerned 
the loss of property rights in the form a particular lease of premises (which the 
complainants argued was a violation of Article 8 of the Convention and Article 
1 of Protocol no. 1.)16 Although the decisive element of this case was whether 
the alleged violation by the State occurred before or after the entry into force of 
the Convention for Croatia (the decision which the complainants alleged violated 
their rights was handed down by the Supreme Court, conﬁ rming a lower court 
decision, on 15 February 1996; while the decision of the Constitutional Court 
was handed down on 8 November 1999, after the entry into force of the Conven-
tion for Croatia on 5 November 1997),17 the ECHR verdict also contained some 
general observations concerning the Court’s ratione temporis competence. 
The Strasbourg judges stated that the ratione temporis competence of the 
Court needs to be established taking into account the “facts constitutive of the 
14 Although the Strasbourg jurisprudence declares that national courts (institu-
tions) are entitled to legally classify the facts before the court, the ECHR may question the 
classiﬁ cation in the event it is clearly mistaken or arbitrary.  
15 Application no. 30651/05, decision of 14 September 2006 (unpubl.). The journal-
ist, who wrote about corruption in the Russian army, died as the result of a package bomb. 
Five ofﬁ cers were accused of murder, but acquitted in the later criminal trial.
16 Application no. 59532/00, judgement of 8 March 2006, ECHR 2006-III. 
17 The Court had to decide which court decision marked the exhaustion of nation-
al remedies – the judgement of the Supreme Court (handed down before the entry into 
force of the Convention), or the decision of the Constitutional Court (after the critical date 
upon which the Convention entered into force). In its judgement the Court (by majority of 
11 votes to 6) chose the former variant, which deprived the Court of ratione temporis compe-
tence. The separate concurring opinion conﬁ rmed the single issue upon which the majority 
of the judges agreed, i.e. that the decision of the Supreme Court constituted res iudicata. 
If that decision had occurred after 5 November 1997, the Court would have had temporal 
competence.
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alleged interference”. It added that a lack of reaction on the part of a State to 
the alleged interference (“the subsequent failure of remedies aimed at redressing 
th[e] interference”) could not be used to justify a ﬁ nding of the Court’s ratione 
temporis competence (para. 77). It stated that the Convention contains no speciﬁ c 
obligation to legally redress violations of the Convention which occurred in a par-
ticular State prior to the entry into force of the Convention (para. 81).18 To take 
the opposite stance would constitute a retroactive application of an international 
agreement, in violation of the generally-recognised norms of international law, as 
well as calling into question the fundamental distinction between a violation and 
reparations that underlies the law of State responsibility.
The Convention could however be applied in cases of permanent and con-
tinuing violations. But “temporally closed” situations remain beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the Court. In the Blečić judgement, the judges seemed to qualify a State’s 
procedural obligation arising from Article 2 of the Convention as a legal reaction 
to a temporally closed event. In reconstruing its earlier decisions regarding the 
borderlines of its ratione temporis competence, it recalled number of key cases 
which laid down principles preventing the consideration of certain complaints, 
and this included Moldovan and Rostaş judgements (par. 75). “Constitutive facts” 
for the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention, both in its substantive aspect and 
procedural aspect, are the death and date of death.19
III. The Strasbourg jurisprudence concerning the applicability of the procedural 
aspects of Articles 2 and 3 to events which took place prior to the Convention’s 
entry into force in a given State’s territory has not been uniform. In the decision 
of Bălăşoiu v. Romania,20 handed down two years after the Moldovan and Rostaş 
decisions, the Court accepted the admissibility of complaints based on the lack 
of eﬀ ective oﬃ  cial investigation into events alleged to be in violation of Article 3 
of the Convention, even when such events took place prior to the entry into force 
18 See also, Kopecký v. Slovakia, application no. 44912/98, judgement of 28 September 
2004 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 2004-IX, para. 38.
19 The criteria of “constitutive or key facts” allow the Court, when deciding upon tem-
poral jurisdiction, to consider the speciﬁ city of the Convention provisions alleged to have 
been violated and the factual contour of the alleged violation, which in turn allows it to 
conduct an individual case-by-case analysis. See Stamoulakatos v. Greece (no. 1), application 
no. 12806/87, judgement of 26 October 1993, Series A. 271; Kadiķis v. Latvia, application 
no. 47634/99, judgement of 29 June 2000; Litovchenko v. Russia, application no. 69580/01, 
decision of 18 April 2002; Kikots and Kikota v. Latvia, application no. 54715/00, judgement 
of 6 June 2002; Veeber v. Estonia (no. 1), application no. 37571/97, decision of 7 November 
2002; and Zana v. Turkey, judgement of 25 November 1997, RJD 1997-VII.
20 Application no. 37424/97, decision of 20 April 2004 (unpubl.).
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of the Convention in respect of Romania. Furthermore, the Rostaş and Bălăşoiu 
decisions concerned complaints against the same State, and the contradictory 
opinions were handed down (unanimously) by the same Court, although the 
make-up of the Court was diﬀ erent.21 The diametrically-opposed conclusion in 
the Bălăşoiu case – especially in light of the fact that the Romanian authorities 
argued strenuously that the earlier Moldavan case required rejection of the com-
plaint for the very same reasons given therein – would seem to be clear evidence 
of an intent on the part of the Strasbourg judges (or at least some of them) to con-
sciously reject some of the earlier-established principles concerning the timeliness 
of complaints.  
As in the Bălăşoiu case, in 2007 the Court, in the case of Šilih v. Slovenia, 
unanimously decided to review a complaint, which it conﬁ rmed on the merits, 
arguing that Slovenia violated its procedural obligations arising from Article 2 of 
the Convention.22 While the judges admitted that the Court had issued previous 
divergent opinions, it refused to call the decisions contradictory.23 However, in in-
dicating the criteria upon which it would rely in deciding the timeliness of Šilih’s 
complaint, the judges cited that portion of the Blečić decision where the judges 
declared that, in deciding the issue of timeliness, it was necessary to take into 
account “the facts of which the applicant complains and the scope of the Conven-
tion right alleged to have been violated”.24 Moreover, the Court found that, in the 
case before it, Slovenia’s procedural obligation under Article 2 to create an eﬀ ec-
tive judicial mechanism for determining the cause of death was applicable, since 
even though the death occurred prior to the entry into force of the Convention for 
Slovenia, the court procedures regarding the death took place afterwards (paras. 
94–97). It should be noted that the cases of Moldovan, Voroshilov and Kholodov 
also involved investigative or court procedures which took place after the entry 
into force of the Convention, and the procedures involved in the Slovenia case 
do not appear to oﬀ er anything new which would distinguish them from proce-
dures not reviewed in the previous cases before the Court.25
21 The composition of the Court in the Moldovan and Bălăşoiu cases included only two 
judges in common. 
22 Application no. 71463/01, judgement of 28 June 2007. 
23 Such declarations are usually reserved for the Grand Chamber, which may accept 
a case when there are earlier contradictory or hard-to-reconcile opinions, for the primary 
purpose of clarifying the Court’s reasoning in order to offer guidance for future cases.
24 Para. 92 of the Šilih judgement, in reliance on para. 82 of the Blečić judgement.
25 One cannot consider as novum the circumstance that in the Šilih case the court 
procedures were commenced after the entry into force of the Convention in Slovenia, while 
in the earlier cases the investigative procedures were commenced before the entry into force 
of the Convention (with later procedures taking place after the critical date).
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The principles and reasoning set forth in the Bălăşoiu and Šilih cases were 
repeated by the Court in the case of Teren Aksakal v. Turkey,26 where the Court 
determined it had competence to review the allegations of procedural violations of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in connection with the death of a prisoner that 
occurred 12 November 1980. The death happened prior to Turkey’s acceptance of 
the legal right of individuals under the Convention to ﬁ le individual complaints 
to the Commission and the Court (what in eﬀ ect makes the situation analogous 
to the one which occurred prior the Convention’s entry into force). The Court 
next found, by a vote of 5-2, that Turkey violated its procedural obligations under 
both Articles. The two dissenting judges, (Turkish judge Rıza Türmen and Mona-
can judge Antonella Mularoni) wrote a joint dissenting opinion, pointing out the 
increasing inconsistency in the Strasbourg jurisprudence and calling for the inter-
vention of the Grand Chamber to resolve the inconsistencies.27
The postulates in the dissenting opinion of judges Türmen and Mularoni 
envisioned a scenario whereby the Turkish government would, in the Teren Ak-
sanal case, ﬁ le a request for referral to the Grand Chamber requesting clariﬁ cation 
of the two conﬂ icting interpretations, and in eﬀ ect directing the jurisprudence of 
the Strasbourg Court. Even though Turkey ﬁ led such a request, in the interim the 
Grand Chamber issued its judgement in the case of Šilih v. Slovenia28 on 9 April 
2009, which is examined in detail in the next section of this article. 
Prior to the Grand Chamber’s decision in Šilih, the governing standards for 
determining timeliness seemed to be those contained in the Moldovan, Voroshilov, 
and Kholodov decisions. They were also reﬂ ected in the underlying thesis of the 
Grand Chamber’s judgement in the Blečić case, which made the Bălăşoiu, Šilih and 
Teren Aksanal all the more unexpected and explosive, and subjected them to ac-
cusations of being “suspicious and minority views”. However, the “overruling” 
of previous Strasbourg jurisprudence (or even treating it as “divergent” pending 
resolution via a judgement by the Grand Chamber) was not the only juridical 
option open to the Court. It could also have relied upon the judicial mechanism 
26 Application no. 51967/99, judgement of 11 September 2007. 
27 In addition to the cases of Bălăşoiu, Šilih i Teren Aksakal, the Court on two other 
occasions communicated the respondent States applications related to their procedural ob-
ligations arising from Article 2, while accepting at the same that it had no ratione temporis 
competence with respect to the substantive aspects of the case. These cases were Şandru v. Ro-
mania (application no. 22465/03, decision of 6 April 2006, (unpubl.)) and Tuna and Tuna v. 
Turkey (application no. 22339/03, decision of 2 October 2007 (unpubl.)). See also Andrita 
v. Romania (application no. 67708/01, decision of 27 January 2009 (unpubl.)). 
28 Chronologically speaking, the ﬁ rst “dissident” case of Bălăşoiu ended in friendly 
settlement, which the Court accepted, ending the case (judgement of 20 April 2004).
“HISTORICAL SITUATIONS” IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN...
20
of “distinction”, borrowed from the common law tradition and previously made 
use of by the Court. 
The Court used the technique of distinction in the case of Varnava and 
Others v. Turkey, concerning the unknown fate of nine Cyprus Greeks who “dis-
appeared” during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.29 The complaints 
were ﬁ led in the name of the missing as well as on behalf of their next-of-kin 
(wives, parents and children). Before the Court could undertake an assessment 
of the allegations contained in the complaints, it had to decide whether it had 
ratione temporis jurisdiction over them. Even though the Convention had been 
in force in Turkey since 18 May 1954, the Turkish authorities did not recog-
nise the right to ﬁ le individual complaints to the Commission until 28 January 
1987, and only recognised the right to ﬁ le individual complaints to the Court 
on 22 January 1990.
The Court ruled that, contrary to the case of “conﬁ rmed deaths”, which are 
temporally closed and cannot be reviewed by the Court if they took place prior to 
the entry into force of the Convention for a given State (or, in the case of Turkey, 
right to ﬁ le individual complaints), cases of “missing persons” present a perma-
nent, continuing situation which allows the Court to take temporal cognisance 
thereof (para. 110). While the Court acknowledged that such competence could 
naturally only apply to the activities and/or omissions of the State authorities 
after the entry into eﬀ ect of the Convention (or, in the case of Turkey, the right 
to ﬁ le individual complaints), it found that it was authorised to take into account 
facts which took place prior to such date.30 In applying the provisions of Article 
2 to the case of missing persons, it was suﬃ  cient to ﬁ nd that the disappearance 
took place in life-threatening circumstances. In addition, the Court stated that 
when the existence of life-threatening circumstances are related to war activities, 
then contrary to the situation of “non-war disappearances”, it was only necessary 
for the complainants to present “minimal information” that the surrounding cir-
cumstances were life-threatening (para. 130).31 
29 Applications nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, judgement of 10 January 2008. 
30 Similarly, see Hokkanen v. Finland, application no. 19823/92, judgement of 23 Sep-
tember 1994, Series A. 299-A, para. 53; Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 
decision of 19 December 2002 (Grand Chamber), para. 74.
31 With regard to “non-war disappearances” the Court requires the complainant to 
prove that the person who disappeared was at the time “in some way in custody of some-
one acting on behalf of the State”. This standard was elaborated in the “disappearances” 
in north-eastern Turkey and Chechnya. See e.g., Kurt v. Turkey , application no. 24276/94, 
judgement of 25 May 1998, RJD 1998-III, para. 99; Akdeniz and others v. Turkey, application 
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Having determined it had ratione temporis competence, the Court held there 
was a violation of the procedural obligations inherent in Article 2. The judges did 
not present any especially detailed analysis of this issue, relying on the Court’s 
earlier verdict in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey which concerned, inter alia, the fate 
of 1485 Cyprus Greeks “missing” during the 1974 war.32 The Court’s ﬁ nding that 
it had ratione temporis competence was by 6 votes to 1. The only dissenting opin-
ion was that of Turkish judge Gönül Başaran Erönen (who sat on the bench in 
the case as an ad hoc judge). Judge Erönen argued that a missing person(s) case 
of such length as the one before the Court should be treated as one of presumed 
death. He further argued that there was no legal basis for treating a presumed 
death diﬀ erently than an actual death, and if the matter before the Court had 
concerned actual death in the same circumstances, the Court would not have had 
ratione temporis competence.
The Varnava case once again came before the Court after the Turkish re-
quest for review by the Grand Chamber was accepted by a panel of ﬁ ve judges.33 
The Court once again found that it had ratione temporis competence, sharing the 
opinion of the Chamber (paras. 130-150), and went on to ﬁ nd that Turkey vio-
lated its obligations under Article 2. This verdict was reached by a vote of 16 to 1, 
the alone dissenting vote being that of the Turkish judge.
IV. As was mentioned earlier, the discrepancies and divergences in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence regarding ratione temporis competence with regard to the procedural 
obligations of States under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention were to be resolved 
by the Grand Chamber in the case of Šilih. In the ﬁ nal analysis, the Strasbourg 
judges themselves recognised the diﬃ  culties springing from the divergent deci-
sions in its jurisprudence (para. 152). 
The judges’ decision begins with an analysis of the principles set forth in the 
Blečić decision. It examines the eﬀ ects of the “key/constitutive facts” test set forth 
therein as it relates to the temporal aspect of the facts underlying the complaint, 
as well as the necessity to take into consideration the scope of the alleged violation 
of rights guaranteed by the Convention. The Court reminded that the failure of 
a subsequent reaction (redress) to the alleged interference (if such interference 
no. 23954/94, judgement of 31 May 2001 (unpubl.), para. 84; Sarli v. Turkey, application no. 
24490/94, judgement of 22 May 2001 (unpubl.), para. 69; Imakayeva v. Russia, application 
no. 7615/02, judgement of 9 November 2006, ECHR 2006-XI, para. 141.
32 Application no. 25781/94, judgement of 10 May 2001 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 
2001-IV.
33 Judgement of 18 September 2009, to be published in ECHR.
“HISTORICAL SITUATIONS” IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN...
22
took place prior to the entry into force of the Convention), would not serve to 
give the Court ratione temporis competence (para. 146). The Court, however, in-
troduced a new element by saying that the test and criteria of the Blečić case were 
of a “general character”, whereas implementation of the test required taking into 
account the “special nature” of those rights guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Convention. The Court added that Articles 2 and 3 were among “the most funda-
mental provisions in the Convention and also enshrine[d] the basic values of the 
democratic societies making up the Council of Europe” (para. 147). 
The Court’s further analysis took place within the context of this “special 
nature” of the right to life. It pointed out the distinction already made in Stras-
bourg jurisprudence between the substantive and procedural aspects of Article 2. 
At the same time, it stressed that the procedural aspect, connected with the im-
plementation of eﬀ ective proceedings which would allow a victim to uncover the 
facts and provide for an eﬀ ective remedy, whether in the form of criminal or civil 
proceedings or both, constituted an inherent element of Article 2. In other words, 
the Court declared that protection of the right to life could not exist without pro-
cedural safeguards and their eﬀ ective implementation. The procedural aspect 
necessarily and inherently co-exists with the substantive obligations. 
The core of the Court’s argumentation encompasses two concepts: that 
procedural obligations are essential and natural (even if they are the result of an 
evolution in the understanding of the right to life); and that the procedural ob-
ligations are of an autonomous nature and may be treated separately from the 
substantive aspect. As a result, the Court concludes that the requirement to im-
plement eﬀ ective proceedings allowing victims (or their legal representatives) 
to discover facts and granting them appropriate remedies are obligatory upon 
a State-Party to the Convention, even if the facts giving rise to the violation 
of Article 2 occurred before the entry into force of the Convention in the territory 
of such State-Party (para. 159).34 
34  It should be emphasised that the Court developed this legal mechanism for stretch-
ing this procedural aspect back to before the “critical date” − described below − based solely 
on the provisions of Article 2 of the Convention. Not even the UN Human Rights Commit-
tee has gone so far (in applying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 
nor has the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (in its rulings on the American Con-
vention on Human Rights). The UN Committee connected the procedural aspect with the 
prohibition on inhuman treatment of next-of-kin (Article 7 of the Covenant) and the right 
to a fair trial (Article 14); and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights connected the 
procedural aspect with the right to a fair trial (Article 8 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights) and the right to legal protection (Article 25). See the Court’s review of the 
jurisprudence of these two institutions in paras. 111-118 of the Šilih judgement.
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Of course the practical question arises: for how long (i.e., within what “time 
horizon”) is the Court competent to review whether a given State fulﬁ lled its pro-
cedural obligations. In this context the Strasbourg judges found that the obligation 
to carry out and provide eﬀ ective procedures of investigation and remedy “bind 
the State throughout the period in which the authorities can reasonably be ex-
pected to take measures with an aim to elucidate the circumstances of death and 
establish responsibility for it” (para. 157).
In another part of its judgement, the Court referred to the need for legal 
certainty. Legal certainty is based on legitimate expectations, and thus procedural 
guarantees would have a time limit imposed by common sense. In trying to deline-
ate this time limit, the Court identiﬁ es two principles. Firstly, the ratione temporis 
competence of the Court only concerns the procedural acts or omissions which 
took place after the entry into force of the Convention (para. 162). Secondly, there 
must exist a “genuine connection” (lien veritable) between a given deprivation of 
life and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State. 
The Court attempted to explain this unclear formula as follows: a “signiﬁ cant pro-
portion” (part importante) of the procedural steps required by Article 2 will have 
been or ought to have been carried out after the critical date, i.e. entry into force of 
the Convention (para. 163). For it was not only “some kind of” procedural steps 
which were necessary to be in place after the entry of the Convention, but they 
had to be essential for investigative procedures. With regard to this principle, the 
Court recognised an exception – actually proﬀ ered only as a hypothesis: the Court 
did not exclude that “in certain circumstances the connection could also be based 
on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Con-
vention are protected in a real and eﬀ ective manner” (para. 163 in ﬁ ne). 
I believe that the judgement of the Grand Chamber in the Šilih case 
is one of the most important decisions in the history of the Court. In accordance 
with its principles, the Court obtained ratione temporis competence (upon meet-
ing the conditions set forth in paragraphs 162-163 of the judgement) to exami-
ne whether a State-Party to the Convention fulﬁ lled its procedural obligations 
stemming from Articles 2 and 3 with respect to events which took place prior to 
the “critical date”. The Court based its decision on what was originally a mino-
rity view in its line of reasoning, but it should be emphasised that the Court’s 
decision was supported by the overwhelming majority of judges (15 votes to 2). 
The only dissenting opinions, in favour of upholding the Moldovan, Voroshilov 
and Kholodov precedents, were expressed by the Turkish judge Rıza Türmen and 
the British judge Nicolas Bratza. 
Some of the “fundamental formulas” which the Court expressed as a means 
to establish its ratione temporis competence can indeed raise problems of inter-
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pretation. This is especially true with respect to the key element in the Court’s 
argumentation, the need to ﬁ nd a “genuine connection”. This is a quite general 
formula, and given the fact that there are no earlier guidelines for application 
in the Court’s opinions, it can lead to divergent conclusions or the adoption of 
a casuistic approach in future decisions. Several judges noted the lack of precise 
guidelines in concurring opinions attached to the judgement.35 
The question arises, how wide is the scope of the possibilities to apply the 
Convention after the Šilih case? The criterion of a “genuine connection” elimi-
nates the possibility of a “revitalisation” of proceedings already completed prior 
to the entry into force of the Convention. Complainants will only be able to allege 
a State’s failure to comply with its procedural obligations in cases where proceed-
ings are still underway concerning events which took place prior to the entry into 
force of the Convention on the territory of a State-Party. In practice, such a con-
nection will be possible only in the case of newly acceded States. 
However, the criterion of a “genuine connection” is applicable to “ordinary 
events”. The Court declared that the existence of such a connection will not be 
necessary with regard to situations which require intervention in order to assure 
that the “the guarantees and underlying values of the Convention are protected 
in a real and eﬀ ective manner.” It would seem that in the ﬁ rst instance such “situ-
ations” should be deemed to include instances of crimes against international law 
which were never subject to an eﬀ ective investigation. Judge Vladimiro Zagrebel-
sky raised a similar concern en passant in his concurring opinion, where he wrote 
that the rule of “a reasonable time frame” linking a State’s procedural obligations 
did not concern “crimes not subject to the statute of limitations.”36 
The Šilih judgement makes it possible to question the lack of eﬀ ective pro-
ceedings in the case of acts committed during World War II, if such acts can be 
characterised as international crimes which were never subject to an eﬀ ective 
investigation. While the crimes committed by the Axis powers were investigated 
and the perpetrators brought to justice, the situation regarding the actions of the 
Allied forces is diﬀ erent. The principles set forth in Šilih could be applied, for 
example, to acts committed by the Soviet Army on the eastern territories of the 
Reich, such as the executions which took place on 23 April 1945 in Treuenbri-
35 These are three concurring opinions by judges Peer Lorenzen, Boštjan M. Zupančič 
i Vladimiro Zagrebelsky (which were also joined by four other judges).
36 One may ask why the Court did not clearly express that the “situation” it identiﬁ ed 
concerned international crimes. One hypothesis is that the judges did not wish to have the 
conditions they elaborated narrowed down to be only applicable to such crimes. As it stands, 
the procedural obligations are arguably applicable to a greater range of events.
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etzen outside Berlin.37 By analogy one could also imagine complaints concerning 
other Allied activities, such as the carpet-bombing of German cities,38 or the treat-
ment of Germans in transit centres (Łambinowice, Świętochłowice).39 In the con-
text of other historical events, theoretically it would be possible to question the lack 
of eﬀ ective proceedings even in the massacre of Armenians in Turkey in 1915. 
It should be observed that already the very fact of ﬁ nding a complaint ad-
missible may give some satisfaction to complainants, even if the Court later de-
cides that the respondent State adequately carried out and fulﬁ lled its procedural 
obligations. The Court’s ﬁ nding that it has ratione temporis competence carries 
with it a ﬁ nding that the historical event, which the complainant alleges has not 
been adequately investigated, constitutes an international law crime. The ﬁ ling of 
a complaint may, thus, have a completely diﬀ erent aim than securing a judgement 
against a given State for failure to fulﬁ l its procedural obligations under the Con-
vention (e.g. to secure the legal classiﬁ cation of a given event).40 
The author would like to conclude this discussion of the procedural obliga-
tions of a State-Party arising from Article 2 of the Convention with a certain per-
sonal digression. The author is the initiator of the so-called “Katyń complaint” to 
the ECHR, connected with the murder by the Soviet Union of almost twenty-two 
37 After re-taking the city, following their earlier expulsion by the Wehrmacht, 
Soviet Army units murdered more than a thousand inhabitants. Investigation into this al-
leged war crime was begun on 2008 by the German Prosecutor, who petitioned the Chief 
Military Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce of the Russian Federation for legal assistance. This petition has 
remained unanswered. The crime was described in November 2008 in Brandenburg newspa-
pers and in the all-German Die Welt.
38  Of which the best-known is the allied bombing of Dresden on the night of 13-14 
February 1945, during which 25-40,000 Germans were killed. The fullest description of this 
act is contained in F. Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945, Harper Collins Publishers, 
London: 2004. 
39  For more on the topic of the camp in Świętochłowice see: A. Dziurok (ed.), Obozowe 
dzieje Świętochłowic Eintrachthütte-Zgoda [The history of the Świętochłowice-Eintrachthütte 
Agreement], Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Katowice-Świętochłowice: 2002.
40  The Court has faced such practices in other complaints. For example, the Azerbai-
janis who were deprived of their property and expelled from Nogorny Karabach are accusing 
not only Armenia but also Azerbaijan, the latter for failure to engage in effective actions 
aimed at return of their property. The complainants are not so much interested in obtaining 
a favourable judgement as to Azerbaijan’s guilt as in obtaining the indirect afﬁ rmation of the 
ECHR – as a consequence of its recognising the complaint - that Nagorny Karabach contin-
ues to be Azerbaijani territory. The Georgians expelled from Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia 
are seeking a similar eﬀ ect in their complaints against the Russian Federation and Georgia. 
This manoeuvre was successful for the ﬁ rst time in the case of Ilaşcu and others v. Moldavia 
and Russia (application no. 48787/99, judgement of the Grand Chamber of 8 July 2004, 
ECHR 2004-VII), which concerned Transdniester.
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thousand Polish citizens in 1940. In the light of the “old” Strasbourg decisions 
(Moldovan, Voroshilov and Kholodov), it seemed likely that the case – based on the 
accusation that the completed Russian investigation regarding Katyń did not ful-
ﬁ l its procedural requirements under Article 2 of the Convention (in part because 
the investigation was classiﬁ ed conﬁ dential) – would be rejected by the Court 
based on its lack of ratione temporis competence. In a surprising turn of events, 
however, certain statements made by the Russian courts of ﬁ nal instance in two 
separate verdicts opened up the possibility of reliance on Article 2 of the Conven-
tion. In reviewing the rulings of lower courts concerning procedures involving the 
classiﬁ cation of state secrets and the rehabilitation of victims, the Russian higher 
courts declared that during the prosecution of the Katyń case it was not estab-
lished what happened to the “Katyń victims” after they were transferred in the 
spring of 1940 to the local commissions of the NKVD. This enabled the victims 
to be classiﬁ ed as “missing persons” and to rely on the precedents established in 
the Varnava case. After the Šilih verdict, however, this no longer seems necessary. 
We can ﬁ le a complaint alleging that Russia failed to fulﬁ l its procedural obliga-
tions under Article 2 of the Convention, and because of the character of the under-
lying “substantive events” (the Katyń massacre), the Court, in deciding whether 
to admit our complaint, will have to decide as a preliminary matter whether 
the Katyń massacre constituted an international crime not subject to the statute 
of limitations.41
V. Questions concerning the Court’s ratione temporis competence have also arisen 
in the Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to the protection of property (Art. 1 of 
Protocol no. 1).42 In contrast, however, to the jurisprudence on the procedural 
obligations arising from Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the decisions of the 
41 In the end, the legal argumentation submitted to the Court included, as one vari-
ant, allegations based on the proportion rule (the key events and decisions took place after 
the entry into force in Russia of the Convention, i.e. after 5 May 1998) and as a second vari-
ant qualiﬁ cation of the Katyń massacre as an international crime not subject to the statute 
of limitations. At present three Katyń complaints are before the Court. Most advanced is the 
case of Wołk–Jezierska and Others v. Russia, application no. 29520/09, which the President 
of the First Chamber designated as a priority case in its communication to the Russian Gov-
ernment of 24 November 2009. The two remaining complaints are Kraczkiewicz and Others 
v. Russia, application no. 15120/10, and Wojciechowska and Mazur v. Russia, application 
no. 17883/10.
42 Although this provision formally refers to protection of property (protection de la 
propriété), it has a wider application through its guarantee of “peaceful enjoyment of his pos-
sessions” (respects de ses biens). Art. 1 Protocol nr 1 in full reads as follows:
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Strasbourg Court in this regard have created – at least with regard to basic rules – 
a uniform line of jurisprudence.
Deprivation of property (or other rights in rem) is treated by the Court 
as a temporally closed event. Thus, if the act of expropriation (deprivation of prop-
erty rights) took place before the entry into force of the Convention on the terri-
tory of the State where the act occurred, the provisions of the Convention cannot 
be applied.43 In addition, the continued existence of the eﬀ ects of expropriation 
after the “critical date” are not considered as violations of the Conventions pro-
visions. In other words, the continued existence of such eﬀ ects is not classiﬁ ed 
as a continuous and ongoing interference.44 
Furthermore, inasmuch as Art. 1 of Protocol no. 1 does not guarantee the 
right to acquire property,45 it cannot be interpreted as either creating an obligation 
on the part of a State to return property expropriated before the “critical date”, 
nor as a restraint on the legislative powers of a State to determine the scope and 
conditions according to which expropriated property will be returned to former 
owners.46 Persons excluded from the scope of re-privatisation statutes cannot 
claim that they possessed a “legitimate expectation” of obtaining a particular form 
of property rights.47
1. Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
2. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state 
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accord-
ance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contribu-
tions or penalties.
43 This principle was ﬁ rst enunciated by the Commission in the case of A. B. and Com-
pany A.S. v. Germany, application no. 7742/76, decision of 4 July 1978 (plenary session), DR 
14, p. 179. In that case the Commission relied on the earlier decision of X. v. United Kingdom, 
application no. 7379/76, decision of 10 December 1976, DR 8, p. 211.
44 Malhous v. Czech Republic, application no. 33071/96, decision of 13 December 2000 
(Grand Chamber), ECHR 2000-XII; Mayer and others v. Germany, application nos. 18890/91, 
19048/91, 19342/92 and 19549/92, decision of 4 March 1996, DR 85, p. 5; Brežny i Brežny 
v. Slovakia, application no. 23131/93, decision of 4 March 1996, DR 85, p. 65.
45 Van der Mussele v. Belgium, application no. 8919/80, judgement of 23 November 
1983, Series A. 70, para. 48; Slivenko and Others v. Latvia, application no. 48321/99, decision 
of 23 January 2002 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 2002-II, para. 121.
46 Jantner v. Slovakia, application no. 39050/97, judgement of 4 March 2003, para. 34; 
Szechenyi v. Hungary, application no. 21344/93, decision of 30 June 1993 (unpubl.); X. A.G., 
Y. A.G. and Z. GmbH, application no. 7694/76, decision of 14 October 1977 (plenary ses-
sion), DR 12, p. 131. 
47 Gratzinger i Gratzingerova v. Czech Republic, application no. 39794/98, decision 
of 10 July 2002 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 2002-VII, para. 69.
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The above-mentioned principles established by the Court have been ap-
plied in its review of complaints concerning conﬁ scations against the Germans 
after World War II. Two decisions are examined below; concerning the alleged 
deprivation of the property rights of the so-called “Sudeten Germans” and 
those of the Germans living in formerly German territories granted to Poland 
after World War II.
The resettlement (the Germans use the term “expulsion”) of the Sude-
ten Germans and accompanying property conﬁ scations took place on the basis 
of two so-called “Beneš Decrees”:48 no. 33/1945 of 10 August 1945, stripping 
Czechoslovakian citizenship from those persons who “were granted German or 
Hungarian citizenship by appropriate decrees of the occupying forces”49; and no. 
108/1945 of 30 October 1945, concerning the conﬁ scation of property of Ger-
mans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators, as well as other persons “whom 
the State has reasons not to trust”.50 Following the fall of communism in what 
was then still Czechoslovakia, the legislature passed Act no. 89/1991 on Extra-
Judicial Rehabilitation (which entered into force on 1 April 1991). This Act en-
visioned the correcting of wrongs committed by the communist authorities, in-
cluding the return of conﬁ scated property, if the petitioner was a natural person 
possessing Czechoslovakian citizenship. The provisions of these two acts were 
further developed in two subsequent acts: Act no. 229/1991 on Land Owner-
ship (deﬁ ning the prerequisites for claims for return of property), and Act no. 
243/1992 on Restitution, which in addition to the requirement that the claim-
ant possess Czechoslovakian citizenship added the requirement that the claim-
ant be a permanent resident of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakian Consti-
tutional Court subsequently ruled that the latter requirement was in violation 
48 President Edward Beneš returned from emigration on 9 May 1945. The Decrees, 
which he issued, were later approved by the National Assembly.
49 “Decree of the President of the Republic in the matter of regulating the citizen-
ship of persons of German or Hungarian nationality” (Dekret Presidenta Republiky o úpravě 
československého státního občanství osob národnosti německé a maďarské). Czechoslovakian 
citizenship was reserved to persons who did not commit crimes against Czech and Slovak 
citizens or alternatively “took part in the war of liberation or underwent suffering as a result 
of Nazi or fascist terror.”
50 “Decree of the President of the Republic in the matter of conﬁ scation of enemies’ 
property and of the national rebuilding fund” (Dekret Presidenta Republiky o konﬁ skaci 
nepřátelského majetku a Fondech národní obnovy). This decree also exempted from its provi-
sions persons who actively fought to retain the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia or to 
liberate the country. 
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of the Czechoslovakian Constitution.51 At the same time, the Court upheld the 
validity of Decree no. 108/1945.52 
The post-war decisions concerning nationalisation were the subject of a com-
plaint ﬁ led by Bergauer and 89 others against the Czech Republic.53 They argued 
that the decisions violated Art. 1 Protocol no. 1 in connection with Article 14 of the 
Convention prohibiting discriminatory treatment. In the opinion of the authors of 
the complaint, the Beneš Decrees, still in eﬀ ect today, constituted an act of illegal 
discrimination inasmuch as they were based on the criteria of nationality and citi-
zenship. They argued that the post-communist legislation concerning the return of 
property suﬀ ered from the same legal defects. They also argued that the Czechoslova-
kian (later Czech) laws in question violated the principle of the supremacy of natural 
law over state law in questions connected with the restitution of property (sic!). 
Their complaint also contained some “politically provocative” statements. 
In the ﬁ rst place, they alleged that the conﬁ scation of property and expulsion from 
Czechoslovakia constituted an (ongoing) act of genocide against the German 
people. Secondly, the complaint questioned the continuity (i.e. validity) of the 
Czechoslovakian government, which existed until October 1938, and then again 
from May 1945. According to the complainants the Beneš Decrees were an act of 
usurpation, lacking in democratic legitimacy.
The concise meritorious section of the Court’s decision, consisting of just 
four pages, seems nevertheless to be superﬂ uous. The judges could have dismissed 
the complaint relying solely on the failure to exhaust national remedies (Article 35 
para. 1 of the Convention). As is well known, complainants may not lodge com-
plaints with the Court until they have taken advantage of all available national 
remedies at all levels, i.e. they are required to defend their rights ﬁ rst in the courts 
of the State alleged to have violated them. The German complainants did not lodge 
complaints either with the Czech courts of general jurisdiction, nor in the Constitu-
tional Court. The only exception to the requirement that all national remedies must 
be exhausted is if the national remedies available can be proven to be futile or exist 
only “in theory”. But proof of the foregoing needs to be presented to the Court.54 
51  Judgements of 12 April 1994 and 13 December 1995. These decisions modiﬁ ed 
the law and permitted persons previously prohibited by the provisions from raising claims 
to do so. 
52 Judgement of 8 March 1995 (Constitutional complaint of R. Dreihaler).
53 Application no. 17120/04, decision of 13 December 2005 (unpubl.). 
54 These principles are summarised in the case of Akdivar and others v. Turkey, 
application no. 21893/93, judgement of 16 September 1996 (Grand Chamber), RJD 1996-IV, 
paras. 67-68.
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The Court ﬁ rst referred to its earlier declarations concerning the temporally 
closed nature of conﬁ scations, reiterating that when such conﬁ scations occur be-
fore the “critical date” they cannot be reviewed in Strasbourg. If, however, a State 
implements – not only following ratiﬁ cation of the Convention but earlier as well 
– legislation which is aimed at the return of conﬁ scated property or restitution 
for deprivation thereof, such legislation may constitute the creation of new pro-
perty entitlements (rights), which would be subject to the protections contained in 
Art. 1 Protocol no. 1 of the Convention. The beneﬁ ciaries of such legal protections, 
however, could only be those persons who fulﬁ l the criteria contained in the legisla-
tion. The delineation of criteria for restitution for the loss of property belongs to 
the national authorities. They can condition the return of property upon the fulﬁ l-
ment of various criteria, such as, for example, citizenship or permanent residence. 
The Strasbourg Court does not possess ratione materiae competence to examine the 
complaints of persons who do not fulﬁ l the national legislative criteria, for in their 
case no new property rights can be said to have arisen (nor legitimate expectations). 
The Czech legislation concerning restitution restricted to right to regain property 
conﬁ scated after the Second World War upon the actual possession of Czech citi-
zenship. The complainants in the case did not fulﬁ l that requirement.55 
If the Court is not competent to review allegations of violations of Art. 1 
of Protocol no. 1 – whether for the temporal (historical expropriations) or sub-
stantive reasons (failure to fulﬁ l legislative criteria) – then it cannot review the 
same allegations based on a non-self-reliant claim of discrimination according to 
Article 14 of the Convention. A violation of the prohibition against discrimina-
tion cannot exist on its own, but may only arise in circumstances whereby a given 
matter falls under the protection of a right guaranteed by the Convention.56 This 
principle also excludes the questioning of “discriminatory” choices made by State 
authorities. The discriminatory nature of national legislation may, however, be 
questioned in the national courts, in particular in those competent to judge the 
constitutionality of legislation in those countries with constitutional provisions 
forbidding certain forms of discrimination. 
55 It is worth observing that the Court, en passant, noted that the Czech courts guaran-
teed the protection of lost property rights (via restitution) to a greater degree than the standards 
of the Convention. They ordered the return of conﬁ scated property – something not required 
by the Convention – in instances where the provisions of the Benes Decrees were violated.
56 This interpretation of Article 14, which has been consistently and consequently 
applied by the Court until now, was elaborated for the ﬁ rst time in the applications aris-
ing from the Belgian language provisions; application nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 
1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64, judgement of 23 July 1968, Series A. 6, part “The Law”, 
pt. I.B, para. 9.
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It should be stressed, however, that this situation has been changed by Pro-
tocol no. 12, which entered into force (in respect of some countries) on 1 April 
2005.57 It transforms the prohibition against illegal discrimination into a self-ex-
isting norm, independent of another right guaranteed by the Convention. Follow-
ing the ratiﬁ cation of this Protocol, it may be possible to argue that the provision 
of the Convention has been violated if the return of property, or restitution there-
fore, is made dependent upon the fulﬁ lment of improper “discriminatory crite-
ria”. The general prohibition against discrimination contained in Art. 1 of the 
Protocol58 may now generate enormous legal consequences. Thus, in the context 
of possible claims for restitution one should seriously consider whether it makes 
sense to bind Poland with Protocol no. 12 before the passage of re-privatisation law 
(which is currently in the legislative process).59
The resettlements/expulsions and conﬁ scations imposed on those Germans 
who lived in the formerly German territories transferred to Poland after the World 
War II (often referred to colloquially in Poland as the “regained land”) became the 
object of a broadly commented complaint ﬁ led by Preussische Treuhand GmbH i Co. 
KG A.A. against Poland.60 The Court examined the facts underlying the complaint 
with regard to twenty-three persons who were members of the Prussian Trust and on 
whose behalf the Trust ﬁ led the complaint. It was decided at the same time that the 
Trust itself could not be deemed to have the status of a “victim” (para. 47).
The complainants alleged a violation of Art. 1 of Protocol no. 1. Their com-
plaint was dismissed without a review on the merits for several reasons. In the ﬁ rst 
57  European Treaty Series no. 177. The Protocol was opened up for signature on 4 No-
vember 2000. As of the time of writing this article, 17 States have ratiﬁ ed the Protocol (and 
it has entered into force in their territories), while 20 others have only signed it.
58  The general prohibition in Article 1 reads as follows: 
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. 
2.. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such 
as those mentioned in paragraph 1.
59 Czechs have only signed Protocol no. 12, but they did not ratify it. Poland, along 
with nine other States, has not even signed the Protocol.
60 Application no. 47550/06, decision of 7 October 2008, to be published in ECHR. 
See also, I.C. Kamiński, Skargi Powiernictwa Pruskiego v. Poland w Europejskim Trybunale Praw 
Człowieka [The Case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & Co. KG A.A. v. Poland in the ECHR], 
Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2007, no. 2; M. Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, Skarga Powiernict-
wa Pruskiego – glosa do orzeczenia ETPCz z 7.10.2008 w sprawie Preussische Treuhand GmbH 
& Co. KG A.A. v. Poland [Preussische Treuhand GmbH & Co. KG A.A. v. Poland – the deci-
sion of 7.10.2008], Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2009, no. 2.
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place, several complaints concerned conﬁ scation of real property and other rights 
associated with the ownership of property which was located in former East Prus-
sia, i.e. in the territory which after the war was administered by the Soviet Union, 
and earlier constituted a war front for actions by the Red Army. The Court held 
that Poland could not be responsible for actions (or their eﬀ ects), which took 
place on territory conquered and subsequently subjected to the administration by 
another State (para. 52). Hence this part of the complaint was held to be inad-
missible ratione personae.
Secondly, the largest group of persons alleging deprivation of property were 
Germans who were resettled immediately after the war. In this context the Court 
called attention to two circumstances. Poland issued several legal acts between 
6 May 1945 and 15 November 1946 which concerned the conﬁ scation of prop-
erty formerly belonging to Germans.61 This legislation, however, was the con-
sequence of implementing provisions agreed upon at the Yalta Conference and 
contained in the Potsdam Agreement, provisions which laid down, in accordance 
with then-existing international law, the principles governing war reparations 
for Poland (para. 59). Hence there was no illegal, unoﬃ  cial expropriation which
would have been capable of creating an “ongoing situation” (in contrast to 
Loizidou v. Turkey discussed below). The stripping away of German property 
rights which occurred after the World War II constituted a temporally closed event 
over which the Court had no ratione temporis competence (paras. 60-61). Lastly, 
the Convention makes no provision for restitution or damages for the deprivation 
of property which occurred before the “critical date” (para. 64). Nor was there 
any Polish law in existence (i.e. new property laws) concerning persons deprived 
of the their property rights which would grant such persons a “legitimate expecta-
tion” concerning property for the purposes of Art. 1 of Protocol no. 1 (para. 61). 
Thus, the Court also lacked ratione materiae competence.
V. The above-mentioned complaints of the Sudeten Germans and the Prussian 
Trust both repeat the claim of an illegal deprivation of property. In the former, the 
validity of the Beneš Decrees was also called into question (in reliance on the lack 
61  These were: the Act of 6 May 1945 concerning abandoned properties, Dz.U. 1945, 
No. 9, item 45; the Decree of 8 March 1946 concerning abandoned and formerly German 
properties, Dz.U. 1946, No. 17, item 97; the Decree of 6 September 1946 concerning ag-
ricultural property and settlements on the Regained Lands and in the former Free City of 
Gdańsk, Dz.U. 1946, No. 49, item 279; the Decree of 15 November 1946 concerning prop-
erty of States between 1939-1945 now in the State of Poland, and the property of legal enti-
ties and of citizens of such States, as well as the administration of such property. Dz.U. 1946, 
No. 62, item 342.
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of continuity of the Czechoslovakian government), and both cases include com-
mon allegations of deprivation of property in connection with proceedings which 
are characterised as ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and even genocide. 
These latter accusations must not be treated as solely politico-legal rhetoric on the 
part of the complainants. Rather, they are aimed at making a distinction in terms 
of classiﬁ cation of the underlying acts in such a manner as would allow the Court 
to ﬁ nd ratione temporis competence, even though the acts alleged to constitute an 
illegal deprivation occurred prior to the “critical date”.
The distinction mentioned above has its roots in the case of Loizidou v. Tur-
key.62 In that case the Strasbourg institutions examined the legality of property 
expropriations which took place in Northern Cyprus when Turkey, following its 
invasion of 1974, proclaimed the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (the actual declaration of independence occurred on 15 November 1983). 
With the exception of Turkey, no other country recognised the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an independent State.
Loizidou owned several plots of land which were located on the northern 
side of the “intra-Cyprus” border. She was unable to enjoy the use of her property 
inasmuch as the Turkish authorities prohibited her – as it did to many Cyprus 
Greeks – to return to the Turkish-occupied side of the island. Furthermore, the 
later Constitution of the TRNC (of 7 May 1985) contained a provision stating 
that all real property and attachments thereto, which on the day of 13 February 
1975 (the date of proclamation of the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus, the pred-
ecessor to the TRNC) was abandoned or without ownership, would become the 
property of the TRNC (Art. 159). 
The Court determined that it was competent to examine the allegation in 
the complaint of a violation of Art. 1 Protocol no. 1 of the Convention because – in 
its opinion – the complainant never lost her title to the property in question.63 
In other words, prior to the date Turkey recognised the jurisdiction of the ECHR 
62 Application no. 15318/89. The Court, acting at all times as Grand Chamber, ﬁ rst 
issued a decision on the preliminary objections connected with the admissibility of the com-
plaint (23 March 1995, Series A. 310), later issued its judgement on the merits (18 Decem-
ber 1996, RJD 1996-VI), and ﬁ nally its judgement on the ﬁ nancial settlement of the claims 
(28 July 1998, RJD 1998-IV). Earlier the complaint had been the subject of a Commission 
report: from 8 July 1993 (plenary session). See also the decision to admit the application of 
4 March 1991 (plenary session), DR 68, p. 216.
63 Para. 46 of the judgement on the merits. In its decision concerning the preliminary 
objections, in particular regarding the allegation that it lacked ratione temporis competence, 
the Court stated that in resolving such an objection it had to take into account its assessment 
of the underlying allegations on the merits (paras. 103-105).
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over individual complaints (22 January 1990) there was no valid legal act passed in 
concreto which would have had the legal eﬀ ect of depriving the complainant of her 
property rights. Even the legal act of expropriation in abstracto in Article 159 of the 
TRNC Constitution could not constitute a legal act of expropriation, for the new 
State was not recognised by the international community.64 
The case of Loizidou is significant because the Court examined the 
legality of the expropriation of property rights. It conducted an examination 
into the national norm which constituted the alleged legal basis for the ex-
propriation and applied international law in assessing its validity. It appears 
that the Court would have reached the same conclusion even if the expro-
priation had not occurred on the basis of a general constitutional norm, but 
rather as the result of an individual confiscation decision undertaken by an 
organ of the TRNC. In order to determine whether a legal act of expropria-
tion took place (thus creating a temporally closed situation), or whether the 
underlying expropriation only created a de facto obstacle to the complainant’s 
use and enjoyment of her property (which would create an ongoing inter-
ference), it would appear that the key element is the “legality” of the State 
undertaking the expropriation or confiscation, not the legal form or method 
used to accomplish it.
On the basis of the Loizidou case, one may ask how the legal analysis adopt-
ed by the Court might have looked if the legal basis for the expropriation had 
been a Turkish law. In light of the Prussian Trust case, one might hypothesise that 
an act of expropriation may not be the consequence of an illegal situation under 
international law.65 The invasion of another State and creation of a puppet admini-
stration to control it, even if assumes the title of an “independent State”, would 
surely constitute such an illegal situation. The situation involving the expulsion 
of Sudeten Germans (and conﬁ scation of their property) and the resettlement 
of Germans from the western lands of post-war Poland is a very diﬀ erent situa-
64  The TRPC’s proclamation of independence was declared invalid in Resolutions 
541 (1983) and 550 (1984) of the UN Security Council, calling on the members of the UN 
to recognise the Republic of Cyprus as the sole representative of Cyprus territory.  The decla-
ration of independence was also condemned by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe, the European Community, and the heads of government of the British Common-
wealth of Nations. 
65 In para. 61 the Court declared, after recapitulating the “key circumstances” con-
cerning the post-war conﬁ scation of German properties in Poland, that the “the applicants’ 
arguments as to the existence of international-law violations entailing the ‘inherent unlaw-
fulness’ of the expropriation measures adopted by the Polish authorities and the continuing 
effects produced by them up to the present date must be rejected.”
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tion from that of Northern Cyprus. The expulsion and expropriation took place 
as part of the creation of a post-war territorial order in Europe, establishment of 
war reparations, and the execution of the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement 
signed by the three key States in the Allied coalition.66 These factors legalised 
the resettlements and conﬁ scations.67 In this context it is not necessary to ﬁ nd 
a post-expropriation status (and thus a temporally closed situation), for the prop-
erty deprivations occurred on the basis of individual acts; it was suﬃ  cient that the 
expropriation were based on a general and abstract norm contained in national 
legislation (decrees, acts). 
The issue of the legality of the expropriation, so key to the Loizidou case, 
raises the question how far the Court might be willing to go to verify the legal-
ity and appropriateness of a given conﬁ scation/expropriation.68 It should be kept 
in mind that the majority of post-war conﬁ scations took place without granting 
damages or compensation, which was in violation of established rules of interna-
tional law. Nonetheless the post-war expropriations can and must be distinguished 
from the Cyprus case. In the former the particularly complex situation of creating 
a post-war territorial order must be taken into account. This does raise the issue of 
comparison of the communist expropriations (nationalisation of property) with 
the conﬁ scations of German properties. It would seem that the Court would need 
to take account of the fact that communist expropriations occurred in a political 
system based on values diametrically opposed to those characterising the States 
of the Council of Europe, which would minimise the number of requirements to 
deem the expropriation “legal”. In fact the Court acknowledged, in the Bergauer 
case, that the right to return of property expropriated not in accordance with exist-
ing national laws concerning conﬁ scation/expropriation (or the granting of dama-
ges therefore) is nowhere written into Art. 1 of Protocol no. 1 (thus the Czech 
courts were found to have oﬀ ered greater protections against property deprivation 
than required by the Convention). The Court thus acknowledged implicite that 
66 These circumstances were stressed in the Prussian Trust case (para. 59). See also 
para. 61, alleging that the arrangements were also conﬁ rmed by bilateral treaties between 
Poland and Germany conﬁ rming the Potsdam borders.
67  Even though this issue was addressed only in the Prussian Trust case, it could also 
be applied to the resettlements in Czechoslovakia, which were also approved in Chapter XII 
of the Potsdam Agreement.
68 The Court found the violations of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 by an 11-6 vote. Among 
the dissenting judges, the Hungarian judge András Baka i Slovenian judge Peter Jambrek 
expressed apprehension in their dissenting opinion that the Court’s decision might lead to 
the questioning of property re-alignments which took place in the countries of East-Central 
Europe following World War II.
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despite the “illegality” of the expropriation in casu, it nevertheless brought about 
a loss of property rights, and hence created a temporally closed situation.69 
The Cyprus case has to be treated diﬀ erently. The complete responsibility 
for the expropriation undertaken by the TRNC was ascribed to a State which, 
at the time of the expropriation, was a member of the Council of Europe and 
a State-Party to the Convention. In addition, the act of expropriation took place 
on territory formally belonging to Cyprus, also a member of the Council of Europe 
and State-Party to the Convention. Thus, the alleged violation of the Convention 
took place within the so-called “legal space” (espace juridique) of the Convention. 
Put diﬀ erently, since prior to the invasion by the Turkish army the entire island 
of Cyprus was protected by the provisions of the Convention, then surely Turkey, 
also a State-Party to the Convention, was required to assure that all the rights and 
freedoms of the Convention prevailed on the territory it occupied. The Conven-
tion, after all, is of a “special character”, constituting an instrument of European 
public order (ordre public) (para. 93 of the Loizidou judgement). If Turkey could 
not be held accountable for the conditions prevailing in that part of the island it 
occupied, then certainly no other legal entity could be liable. 
VII. The Court’s refusal to ﬁ nd that the resettlement of Germans and conﬁ s-
cations of their property violated Art. 1 of Protocol no. 1 need not mean that 
it would rule similarly in all instances of post-war expulsions and expropriations. 
In the ﬁ rst instance, this concerns the so-called “voluntary resettlements”. These 
also involved Germans (or persons claiming German nationality) who were not 
subject to forced resettlement/expulsion, but rather remained in Poland and later
voluntarily “re-settled”. If their real property was not taken by an oﬃ  cial admini-
strative decision (properly recorded in the accompanying mortgage register if 
such an entry existed for a particular real property), then it is possible in such 
69 See also for example I.G. v. Poland and Germany, application no. 31440/96, deci-
sion of 7 January 1997 (unpubl.) (conﬁ scation of property during the German occupation). 
If however the underlying events did not result in a legal conﬁ scation, then the property 
right continued to exist and could be – following the entry into force of the Convention 
in respect of a given State – raised before the Court (such as in Vasilescu v. Romania, ap-
plication no. 27053/95, judgement of 22 May 1998, RJD 1998-III). The issue whether an 
“old” decision conﬁ scating property can be questioned following the entry into force of the 
Convention, creating either a new property right or a reasonable expectation thereof, has 
come before the Court on several occasions. See the differing conclusions of the Court decid-
ing as chamber and the Grand Chamber in Kopecký v. Slovakia, application no. 44912/98, 
judgement of 7 January 2003 and 28 September 2004 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 2004-IX. 
The Court as chamber found a violation by a narrow 4-3 vote, while the Grand Chamber, 
by a vote of 13-4, found no violation.
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instances to speak of a deprivation of property (loss of the right to use and enjoy) 
analogous to the Loizidou case. At the same time, the current eﬀ orts to “regulate” 
the status of such “old” properties via administrative decisions (and record the 
changes in the mortgage register) may be qualiﬁ ed not as a (declaratory) “order-
ing or regulation” of the already existent real property status, but as actual ongoing 
intervention into the property rights of such resettled persons. If the decisions go 
even further and divide the emigrants into groups of Germans and non-Germans, 
then this may also amount to a violation of Art. 14 of the Convention (in connec-
tion with Art. 1 of Protocol no. 1) prohibiting discrimination.
Any discussion of the Convention’s treatment of “historical” loss of prop-
erty rights must also take into account the principles delineated in the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in the so-called “beyond the Bug River” (“zabużański”) properties. 
As a result of the post-war changes in state borders in the eastern lands of the 
former Second Republic of Poland (referred to in Poland as “the eastern lands”), 
over 1.2 million persons were re-settled, leaving behind their real property. In Au-
gust 1944, a so-called “Agreements of Republics” was signed between the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (recognised by the Soviet Union as the Polish 
government) and the Soviet Socialist Republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithua-
nia. As part of the agreements, the Poland took on the obligation to “compensate” 
those persons who were repatriated on Polish post-war territory for the loss of their 
previous real property. This obligation was implemented only to a small extent. 
The key decision of the ECHR in resolving the “beyond the Bug River” 
claims was the judgement in the case of Broniowski v. Poland, issued by the Grand 
Chamber.70 The Court ruled unanimously that it was competent to review the 
complaint and that a violation of Art. 1 of Protocol no. 1 took place. It found that 
the complainants continue to be owed compensation for the property of which 
they were deprived, and that the failure to pay such compensation created an 
ongoing situation of violation (para. 122).71 This decision demonstrates the un-
realistic nature of the proposition, sometimes put forth in Poland, that the Ger-
man government should “take over” the property claims of all expelled Germans. 
70 Application no. 31443/96, judgement of 22 June 2004, ECHR 2004-V.
71 It should be noted that the ﬁ nding of such a right and the scale and means of rem-
edying such a right are two different things. As a result of changes in Polish law, which result-
ed in awarding the “beyond the Bug River” claimants compensation in the amount of 20% 
of the property which remained, the Court took the complaints of 176 “beyond the Bug Riv-
er” complaints off its docket and closed the pilot procedures. See press communiqué no. 691 
of 6 October 2008, as well as: M. Krzyżanowska−Mierzewska, Sprawy mienia zabużańskiego 
przed ETPCz [The Case of the beyond the Bug River property in the ECHR], Europejski 
Przegląd Sądowy 2008, no. 12.
“HISTORICAL SITUATIONS” IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN...
38
If such a scheme were put into place, persons who did not receive compensation 
in Germany would be entitled to take their complaints to the Court based on the 
Broniowski ruling. 
The issue of the existence of a right to compensation for the nationalisation 
of property, which could be framed in a manner similar to that of the complain-
ants in the ‘‘beyond the Bug River’’ situation, has already arisen in the case of Pik-
ielny and Others v. Poland, currently on the Court’s case-list.72 This case concerns 
the lack of damages for the deprivation of property on the basis of the Act of 3 
January 1946 concerning the takeover by the State of basic branches of national 
industry.73 In Article 7 of that Act, it was envisioned that the former owners would 
receive compensation which would be decided upon by a special commission. Ar-
ticle 7 par. 6 provided that the commission was to be created by a separate regula-
tion (ordinance), which in fact was never enacted. 
It seems very likely that the Court will treat the promise to pay damages 
contained in the 1946 legislation analogously to the requirement to compen-
sate the “beyond the Bug River” claimants in the Agreements of Republics.74 
As a result, the Pikielny complaint (like Broniowski) would become a pilot decision, 
identifying a structural defect in Polish law which touches upon a large number 
of legal entities. If the Court agrees with the complainants, in practice this will 
almost surely result in the ﬁ ling of a large number of claims for compensation, 
bringing with it the necessity for passage of appropriate legislation and a need 
to ﬁ nd signiﬁ cant funds in the national budget.75 
VIII. A related matter which has been the subject of several verdicts by the Com-
mission and the Court concerns judgements by national courts classifying certain 
acts committed during World War II or immediately thereafter as crimes against 
72 Application no. 3524/05. This case was joined with the application in Ogórek 
v. Poland, which was ﬁ led in the Court earlier, but communicated to the Polish authorities 
later (application no. 28490/03).
73 Dz. U. 1946, No. 3, item 17 as amended.
74 This was the position taken by the Helsinki Human Rights Foundation in its ami-
cus curiae brief to the Court (ﬁ led on 10 April 2007, available on the internet site of the 
Foundation). 
75 The acknowledgment by the Court that the complainants’ property rights fell 
within the protections of Article 1 of Protocol nr 1 does not mean however that the State 
will be required to pay the complainants the full value of the lost property. On this issue the 
Convention leaves a wide area of discretion, and the right to property may be confronted 
with other rights in the public interest. In the case of the “beyond the Bug River” complain-
ants, the Strasbourg judges decided that the 20% compensation fulﬁ lled the requirements of 
the Convention.
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humanity (or, in some cases, as war crimes). The complainants to the Strasbourg 
institutions (those convicted) have argued that the verdicts in the national courts 
were without legal basis and as such they violated Article 7 of the Convention pro-
hibiting the retroactive application of law.76 
In accordance with the established principles of Strasbourg jurisprudence 
regarding its relations with national courts, the Strasbourg institutions have held 
that “in principle” (as a general rule, primarily) they will defer to the decisions 
and applications of national law in national courts 77 This principle also concerns 
the application of international law to resolve disputes in national courts.78 The 
task of the Court is to assess whether the eﬀ ects of the national courts’ interpre-
tations are in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The role of the 
Strasbourg judges is not, however, to correct errors of fact or law allegedly com-
mitted by national courts, unless such errors led to a violation of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.79 
The above-described principles were applied in the cases involving national 
court verdicts ﬁ nding defendants guilty of committing crimes against humanity as a 
result of their actions during or just after World War II. The complainants (defend-
ants in the national courts) argued that their actions did not constitute crimes at the 
time they were committed. They also argued that the retroactive application of the 
law in their cases was based on provisions of international law eliminating the stat-
ute of limitations for certain crimes, and that such provisions of international law 
76  Article 7 provides that:
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omis-
sion which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international
  law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed 
than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according 
to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.
77  Kopp v. Switzerland, application no. 23224/94, judgement of 25 March 1998, 
RJD1998-II, para. 59; N. v. Denmark, application no. 13926/88, decision of 4 October 
1999, DR 66, p. 209; S. v. Switzerland, application no. 17722/91, decision of 8 April 1991, 
DR 69, p. 345.
78 Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, application no. 26083/94, judgement of 18 February 
1999 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 1999-I, para. 54.
79 Schenk v. Switzerland, application no. 10862/84, judgement of 12 July 1988 (ple-
nary session), Series A. 140, para. 45; Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, application 
nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, judgement of 22 March 2001 (Grand Chamber), 
ECHR 2001-II, para. 49; Jorgic v. Germany, application no. 74613/01, judgement of 12 July 
2007, to be published in ECHR, para. 102; García Ruiz v. Spain, application no. 30544/96, 
judgement of 21 January 1999 (Grand Chamber), ECHR 1999-I, paras. 28-29.
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stem from the United Nations Convention of 26 November 1969,80 which was also 
not in eﬀ ect at the time of the commission of the acts by the complainants.
The Strasbourg institutions aﬃ  rmed the judgments of the national courts, 
ﬁ nding them not to be in violation of Article 7 of the Convention. At various 
places, they emphasised that paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Convention was 
speciﬁ cally aimed at sanctioning post-war legislation regarding the apprehen-
sion and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes, treason, or collaboration 
with the enemy, as evidenced by the reports of the drafters of the Convention. 
The same ratio legis identiﬁ ed in travaux préparatoires was extended to cover crimes 
against humanity as well.81 
As a consequence of the restricted review undertaken by the Court and the 
Commission, these two Strasbourg institutions agreed with the national courts 
and did not ﬁ nd violations of Article 7 of the Convention in several high proﬁ le 
cases. Furthermore, it happened not only in cases concerning the actions of fascist 
governments and administrations under the control of fascist governments, but 
also the actions of communist (i.e. Soviet) governments and those governments 
under Soviet control.
In the following cases, the Court accepted conviction for “historical acts” 
deemed to constitute crimes against humanity (or war crimes) in States-parties 
to the Convention:
a) Touvier v. France – during the war, the complainant was one of the high 
oﬃ  cers of the state militia in Lyon, supervised by the Germans;82
b) Papon v. France – during the war, the complainant was a high administra-
tive clerk accused of taking part in the deportation of Jews to concentra-
tion camps;83 
c) Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia – the complainants were workers in the Soviet 
security organs and after the war took part in the preparatory activities 
and the deportation of Estonians to the hinterlands of the Soviet Union;84
80 Dz.U. 1970, No. 26, item 208 as amended by Dz.U. 1971, No. 7, item 85. The UN 
Convention entered into force on 11 November 1970.
81  Touvier v. France, application no. 29420/95, decision of 13 January 1997 (plenary 
session), DR 88, p. 148.
82  Application no. 29420/95, decision of 13 January 1997 (plenary session), DR 88, 
p. 148.
83  Application no. 54210/00, decision of 15 November 2001, ECHR 2001-XII.
84  Application nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04, decision of 17 January 2006, ECHR 
2006-I.
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d) Penart v. Estonia – the complainant was a high-level functionary in the 
Soviet security organ, organising actions (including murders) against 
activists in the post-war anti-communist guerrilla organisations.85
Recently, however, the ECHR has departed from its custom of limited review 
of national court convictions of international war crimes, in the case of Konon-
ov v. Latvia.86 It declared that its principle granting national courts a wide scope 
of authority in applying and interpreting national law does not extend to situa-
tions where the Convention clearly refers to national legislation (or international 
law). In such cases, errors in the application of such national legislation (or inter-
national law) may result in a violation of the Convention, especially with regard 
to Article 7. If a national court applies a legal criminal norm (arising from either 
national or international law) to a situation where such norm is inapplicable, it di-
rectly violates the provision of Article 7 providing that “No one shall be held guilty 
of any criminal oﬀ ence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute 
a criminal oﬀ ence under national or international law at the time when it was com-
mitted” (para. 110). In elaborating this rule, the Court made the following distinc-
tion: national courts are authorised to determine the facts, and in this sphere the 
Strasbourg judges must grant wide discretion; but determining which law applies 
to the facts and how it is to be applied is a diﬀ erent matter (para. 111). 
The Kononov case involved the leader of a group of Soviet guerrilla parti-
sans, who during a reprisal raid on a village in 1944 killed nine inhabitants of the 
village, whom they accused of earlier providing information to the Germans and 
of giving up other guerrilla partisan formations in the village. Among the nine 
inhabitants killed were three women, one in the last month of pregnancy (she was 
thrown into a burning building).
After the war, Kononov, a Latvian citizen, received the Order of Lenin, the 
highest Soviet medal, for his war eﬀ orts. After the Latvians regained indepen-
dence, they accused Kononov of war crimes, found him guilty, and sentenced him 
to twenty months in prison. In Russia, the Kononov case was presented as the 
persecution of a “hero of the War for the Fatherland (the Russian term for the 
World War II)” and as part of a general scheme on the part of the Baltic states to 
“falsify history”. President Putin granted Kononov Russian citizenship in April 
2000, and the authorities of the Russian Federation joined Kononov’s complaint 
to the Court as an “interested third party,” obviously in support of his position.
85  Application no. 14685/04, decision of 24 January 2006 (unpubl.).
86  Application no. 36376/04, judgement of 24 July 2008. See also the later judgement 
in Korbely v. Hungary, application no. 9174/02, judgement of 19 September 2008 (Grand 
Chamber), to be published in ECHR. 
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By the narrowest of margins in a 4-3 vote, the Court found that Kononov’s 
conviction was in violation of Article 7 of the Convention. The Strasbourg judges 
questioned the qualiﬁ cation assigned to Kononov’s action by the Latvian courts, 
in particular the ﬁ nding that persons murdered were, based on the rules of then-
existing international humanitarian law (of 1944), civilians and not combatants. 
According to the ECHR, the “fallback rule of interpretation”, based on the prin-
ciple that if someone does not belong to a clearly deﬁ ned category such as “com-
batant” then he or she should be classiﬁ ed as a civilian, is derived from post-war 
legal acts (the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Times of War of 12 August 1949; and the Fourth Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Convention Concerning the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conﬂ icts of 8 June 1977). These legal norms did not exist in 1944, and 
under the existing circumstances Kononov had the right to treat the nine village 
inhabitants as combatants.87 The Latvian Courts thus convicted him for “an act 
which did not constitute a criminal oﬀ ence under national or international law at 
the time when it was committed,” in violation of Article 7 of the Convention.
The three dissenting judges (Elisabet Fura-Sandström, David Thór 
Björgvinsson, and Ineta Ziemele) raised two fundamental arguments in their 
joint dissenting opinion. Firstly, they questioned the Court’s interference into 
a sphere traditionally reserved to the national courts, i.e. the interpretation 
of law.88 Secondly, they disagreed that the later post-war legal norms governing 
international humanitarian law were applied retroactively.89 
It is worthwhile to note the far-reaching consequences resulting from the 
concurring opinion of the Dutch judge Egbert Myjer, who agreed with the Court’s 
87 The men were equipped with riﬂ es and grenades received from the Germans “for 
purposes of self-defence” which allowed them − according to the Court − to be classiﬁ ed as 
combatants. The treatment of the women created greater problems, but the Court found 
that, by their participation in giving up the ﬁ rst group of guerrilla ﬁ ghters, they “abused 
their civilian status” (para. 139).
88 This issue is also included in the additional separate individual opinion by judge 
David Thór Björgvinsson, who also pointed out that the Court should take into account the 
difﬁ cult and complicated history of Latvia during the World War II, in particular the fact that 
the Soviet Union appeared not in role of liberator, but rather as an “enemy occupying force”. 
89 It was argued that, among other things, the inhabitants of the village unquestiona-
bly deserved civilian status (and the protections that went with it) as a result of the so-called 
Marten’s clause, which established the permanent elements of the law of war and humani-
tarian law beginning from the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (this clause, which was 
expressed in various ways, granted to civilians the protections of the law of nations, based 
on the concepts of humanity and public conscience; it also forbade leaving the judgment 
of situations not envisioned in the Conventions to the “arbitrary assessments of the leaders 
of armed forces”). 
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decision, but argued that it should have been based on diﬀ erent reasoning. Judge 
Myjer expressed the view that the principles contained in the charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, commonly known as the Nuremberg Tribunal, upon 
which the Latvian courts relied in convicting Kononov, were only applicable to the 
acts committed by “war criminals” of the Axis powers (as well as their collabora-
tors in other States). The Nuremberg principles cannot be applied to acts, even if 
such acts constituted crimes under international law, perpetrated by the Allied 
coalition of States or persons acting on their behalf. Based on Myjer’s reasoning, 
the Nuremberg Tribunal constituted an exceptional institution, a place for “set-
tling wrongs arising from the war.” This was its speciﬁ c purpose, and its rules and
authority extended no further than what was necessary to accomplish its purpose. 
To the extent the Nuremburg principles could be considered as rudimentary norms 
of international justice and as prohibitions of certain activities, they could only be 
applied universally to future acts. i.e. to acts committed after the conclusion of the 
World War II. If Judge Myjer’s views were accepted as a statement of existing law, 
convicting any member of the Allied coalition of a war crime would be a violation 
of Article 7 of the Convention.
I cannot agree with such an interpretation. While the Charter of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal established what categories of persons would be tried in front of it, 
the material legal principles it set forth must be understood as universal. They 
were not “created” only in relation to the “losers” (which would be an example of 
a retroactive application of the law), but were drawn up as a reﬂ ection of the actual 
status of international criminal law which existed at the time. As a consequence, 
the “main war criminals” of the Axis powers were tried at Nuremberg, and the re-
maining “war criminals” – regardless of which side they fought on – could be tried 
in national courts.
The Kononov case is in fact the only case to come before the Court up to day 
wherein a person ﬁ ghting on the side of the Allied coalition was convicted of a war 
crime (international law crime) in a national court. It naturally aroused strong 
emotions in the political arena, as well as controversy among legal scholars. Hence, 
it came as no surprise that the Grand Chamber agreed to re-hear the case.
On 17 May 2010, the Grand Chamber decided, by a vote of 14 to 3, that Latvia 
did not violate Article 7 of the Convention. It ruled that the international legal prin-
ciples which the Latvian courts determined to be in eﬀ ect at the time of Kononov’s 
actions were delineated with such precision that there could be no doubt but that 
Kononov committed a war crime under existing international law (paras. 216-227). 
The Court also conﬁ rmed that the crime committed was not, in the absence of any 
contravening rules, outside the statute of limitations (paras. 231-232).
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IX. The Strasbourg institutions have also on several occasions reviewed matters 
relating to restrictions on the freedom of expression; restrictions which in various 
ways concerned historical events, particularly those which took place during the 
World War II. An analysis of the decisions reveals that they can be divided into 
three categories of expression/speech and associated issues arising therefrom: 
a) Nazi speech (i.e. referrals to “historical Nazism”) and negationist speech 
(calling into question the historical truth of Nazi crimes);
b) speech/expressions regarding the events of World War II, but presenting 
the facts or the assessment of facts in fashion which deviates from that 
presented by historians or the dominant part of society;
c) speech comparing contemporary politicians or their programs to Nazis 
and fascists or accusing them of white-washing history; or tolerating 
the existence of a person with a Nazi or fascist past in contemporary 
political life.
The most interesting issues with the most far-reaching legal consequences 
arise in the cases involving Nazi or negationist speech. The Strasbourg institu-
tions can analyse national interference with and restrictions on the freedom of ex-
pression in these cases not based solely on the limitation clause found in Article 10 
paragraph 2,90 but within the context of Article 17 of the Convention. This Article 
provides that “[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at 
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.” This 
wording indicated that this is not merely “ordinary” interference with free speech 
allowed by the Convention, but special interference which is not only permissible 
but may even be regarded as mandatory.91 
90  Article 10 of the Convention is as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interfer-
ence by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent 
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights 
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in conﬁ dence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
91 See, for example, the separate opinion of judge Françoise Tulkens to the Leyla Sahin 
judgement, application no. 44774/98, judgement of 10 November 2005, ECHR 2005-XI.
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The legal solution contained in Article 17, although it may be associated 
with the old St. Just maxim that “there is no freedom for the enemies of freedom” 
(Pas de liberté pour les ennemis de la liberté), is quite innovative as a legal formula. 
Its inclusion in the Convention, and its earlier inclusion in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (Article XXX) – which provided the inspiration for the 
Convention – was a direct consequence of the events and experiences preceding 
World War II. The German Nazis came to power in democratic elections.92 In order 
to avoid repetition of the situation whereby a democratic politico-legal order is 
called into question by the ideological enemies of democracy, which are then able 
to take power and install a non-democratic regime using the democratic proce-
dures and freedoms, international human rights instruments93 as well as national 
Constitutions94 include provisions stripping non-democratic expressions and po-
litical activities from the guarantees and protections otherwise available under the 
umbrella of free expression. 
Although the underlying justiﬁ cation for placing Article 17 in the Con-
vention is not seriously questioned in the relevant scholarly literature, there is 
a considerable diﬀ erence of opinion concerning the interpretation of the so-called 
“buﬀ er clause” and its consequences for freedoms and rights guaranteed by the 
Convention. There is also a divergence of views concerning the method of judicial 
analysis and scope of review of the clause used by the Court. The existing Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is not very helpful in resolving the various controversies. Alphonse 
Spielmann (a judge of the Court) has described the position of the Strasbourg 
92 As noted by J. Goebbels in a much-cited remark: “the greatest farce of democracy 
will always consist in the fact that it gives its mortal enemies the means with which to kill it.” 
93 See Article 5 paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as Article 5 paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also con-
tains a so-called “buffer clause” (Art. 54).
94 The most telling are the provisions of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) of 
23 May 1949. In Article 18 it provides that constitutional protections are denied to any 
legal entity which (on the basis of a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court), for the 
purpose of undermining “the free democratic constitutional order” abuses the freedom of 
expression, in particular freedom of the press, freedom of teaching, assembly, association, 
conﬁ dentiality of correspondence, or the right to property or asylum. Article 9 para. 2 pro-
vides additional, special security against abuse of the freedom of association. It prohibits 
any organisation or any association whose avowed aim or activities are directed against the 
constitutional order or “the concept of international understanding” (Gedanken der Völk-
erverständigung).
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institutions to Article 17 as subject to a “variable geometry,”95 and the registrar of 
the Court Marc – André Eissen noted its “deeply rooted ambivalence.”96 
The application of Article 17, and the elaboration of principles of legal 
interpretation with regard thereto, ﬁ rst took place during the preliminary pro-
cedural phase, where the issue was whether a given complaint was admissible. 
Prior to Protocol no. 11, the decision at this phase was made by the Commission. 
A review of the Commission’s decisions reveals a visible evolution, although some 
decisions also diverged from the earlier-elaborated directions identiﬁ ed below.97 
The line of decisions sprang from the banning of the German Communist 
Party (GCP),98 which was labelled as an organisation aimed at instituting a to-
talitarian political system in Germany based on the dictatorship of the proletar-
iat. The Commission ruled that the complaint (by the GCP) was not, in light of 
Article 17, supported by any provisions of the Convention. Put diﬀ erently, the 
complaint did not fall within the ratione materiae competence of the Strasbourg 
institutions. It is important to note that the Commission itself raised the issue of 
the prohibitive eﬀ ect of Article 17 in analysing the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court.
The Commission’s underlying legal reasoning had radical consequences. 
Since it was determined that the Convention did not apply to certain activities (on 
account of their aims), the Strasbourg institutions did not have competence to ex-
amine the sanctions irrespectively how burdensome they might be for the complain-
ants (the issue of proportionality). Two decades later the Commission reaﬃ  rmed 
this interpretation in the case of Glimmerveen and Hagenbeck v. Holland.99 
95 La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et l’abus de droit, in Mélanges en 
hommage à L.-E. Petiiti, Bruxelles 1998, pp. 682-683.
96  Réaction au rapport présenté par M. F.G. Jacobs à l’occasion du quatrième colloque 
international sur la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Rome 1975, p. 203.
97  This evolution is similarly reconstructed by Van Drooghenbroeck, see, S. Van 
Drooghenbroeck, L’article 17 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme est-il indis-
pensable?, Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 2001, vol. 46, pp. 551 and following.
98  Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands v. Germany, application no. 250/57, decision of 
20 July 1957, Yearbook vol. I, p. 222.
99  Application no. 8348/78, decision of 11 October 1979, DR 18, p. 187. The com-
plainants were persons sentenced to two weeks of imprisonment for racist speeches and, 
as members of a banned association, were forbidden to stand as candidates in local elec-
tions (Nederlandse Volks Unie wanted, among other things in its ﬁ ght for the “white race”, 
to deport all foreign workers from the country). In refusing to review the complaint, the 
Commission stated that Article 17 is aimed at depriving “totalitarian groups” from using 
the guarantees of the Convention for the realisation of their aims. It found that the com-
plainants wanted to use the freedoms guaranteed by the Convention for activities “contrary 
to the letter and spirit” of the Convention.
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The use of Article 17 as a “normative and procedural guillotine”100 in the 
GCP and Glimmerveen and Hagenbeck cases was not, however, wholly determina-
tive of the Commission’s jurisprudence. What dominated – which may appear sur-
prising – was a total lack of reference to Article 17 at all. Just several months after 
the GCP decision, in another complaint concerning the same party and the sanc-
tions imposed on it, the Commission referred exclusively to the “substantive” Ar-
ticles of the Convention.101 This approach was repeated in proceedings connected 
with the punishment of activities characterised as neo-Nazi,102 the distribution of 
brochures proclaiming that the extermination of millions of Jews was a “Zionist 
falsehood”,103 and the banning of a political movement based on the ideology of 
the fascist party.104 The Commission acted in an analogous fashion in its analysis 
of complaints which challenged State laws forbidding persons who collaborated 
with the German occupation forces from taking part in elections, engaging in press 
and publication activities, and being members of certain organisations and asso-
ciations.105 The provisions of Article 17 were touched upon only in the Commis-
sion’s report in the case of Becker v. Belgium.106 In that case, the Belgian challenge 
to the provisions of the Convention was unanimously rejected. The Commission 
outlined the rigours associated with the application of Article 17: the methods 
used to combat threats to the democratic system must be strictly proportional 
to the scale of the threat and the length of time the threat existed (para. 279).
100  The designation of Article 17 as a procedural guillotine comes from J.-F. Flaussa, 
L’abus de de droit dans le cadre de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, RUDH 
1992, p. 464. In French literature very often one may encounter the concept of “forfeiture” 
(déchéance) of rights. E.g. R. de Gouttes, A propos du conﬂ it entre le droit à la liberté d’expression 
et le droit à la protection contre racisme, in: Mélanges en hommage à Louis Edmond Pettiti, Bruylant, 
Bruxelles: 1999, p. 260.
101  X., Z. i Y. v. Germany, application no. 277/57, decision of 20 December 1957, 
Yearbook t. I, p. 219. This complaint concerned a sentence imposed for failing to give up 
a printing machine belonging to the communist party and hiding a party member. The Com-
mission applied Articles 8-11 and 14. 
102  X. v. Austria, application no. 1747/62, decision of 13 December 1963, Collection 
v. 13, p. 42. 
103 X. v. Germany, application no. 9235/81, decision of 16 July 1982 (plenary session), 
DR t. 29, p. 194.
104 X. v. Italy, application no. 6741/74, decision of  21 May 1976 (plenary session), 
DR t. 5, p. 83.
105 X. v. Belgium, application no. 924/60, decision of 27 March 1963 (plenary session), 
Yearbook t. 6, p. 150; T.  v. Belgium, application no. 9777/82, decision of 14 July 1983 (ple-
nary session), DR v. 34, p. 158; X. v. Belgium, application no. 8701/79, decision of 3 Decem-
ber 1979 (plenary session), DR 18, p. 252; X v. Holland, application no. 6573/74, decision of 
19 December 1974 (plenary session), DR v. 1, p. 87. 
106  Application no. 214/56, report of 8 January 1960, Series B. 2.
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When one looks at the overall shape of the Commission’s decisions, the 
only exceptional departure from the Commission’s line of reasoning occurred in 
the matter of Glimmerveen and Hagenbeck, which was a revitalisation of the view 
– which seemed to have been rejected – expressed in the GCP case.
In 1984, the Commission “discovered” Article 17 again, although in a new 
and original fashion. The reports it prepared in the cases of Glasenapp and Kosiek 
contained the following thesis: if a State undertakes measures to protect the rule 
of law and democracy, Article 17 gives such aims supremacy over the protection of 
rights guaranteed in the Convention. The need for such State intervention must, 
however, be clearly identiﬁ ed and explained.107 The words used by the Commis-
sion seem to suggest that Article 17 should be applied in conjunction with the 
other provisions of the Convention, hence the need to identify the nature of the 
threat to the rule of law and democracy which would justify the restriction of 
other Convention rights. Article 17 thus loses its character as a “normative guillo-
tine”, becoming instead a speciﬁ c argument which can be put forward in defence 
of restrictions deemed necessary. The agreement of the Strasbourg institutions 
with a State’s reasoning that the restricted activities constitute a threat to the 
rule of law and democracy – but only after a careful review of the restrictions im-
posed and assessment that they do not constitute an abuse of Article 17 – in eﬀ ect 
renders the State’s restrictions prima facie in accordance with the Convention. Put 
diﬀ erently, an exceptionally strong argument is required to undermine a State’s 
ﬁ nding of such a threat and its imposition of restrictions.108 
The later decisions of the Commission are consistent in their analysis of the 
necessity for State intervention (hence fulﬁ lling the third element of the test con-
tained in paragraph 2 of Article 10), taking into account Article 17. Thus it may 
be said that the “buﬀ er clause” of Article 17 has been used as an element of the 
interpretation of Article 10.109 The ﬁ rst decision in which the Commission applied 
107  Glasenapp v. Germany, application no. 9228/80, report of 11 May 1984 (plenary
session), Series B. 87, para. 110; Kosiek v. Germany, application no. 9704/82, report of 
11 May 1984 (plenary session), Series B. 88, para. 106. 
108   The author does not agree with de Gouttes’s assessment that in the Strasbourg ju-
risprudence concerning racist speech/expressions two approaches can be distinguished: one 
based on the guillotine theory and another on balancing the freedom of expression with the 
eﬀ orts to combat racism. It seems to the author that a third approach can also be observed:
 a prima facie assumption that restrictions on racist expressions are justiﬁ ed (R. de Gouttes,
A propos du conﬂ it entre le droit à la liberté d’expression et le droit à la protection contre rac-
isme, in: Mélanges en hommage à Louis-Edmond Pettiti, Bruylant, Bruxelles: 1999, pp. 252 
and following).
109   Van Drooghenbroeck, supra note 98, p. 557, refers to Article 17 as an “interpre-
tative aid” (adjuvant interprétatif). Another author has introduced the concept of “indi-
rect usage” of Article 17: M. Levinet, La fermeté bienvenue de la Cour européenne des droits 
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this interpretation, rejecting a complaint, was the case of Kühnen v. Germany.110 
In identifying those fundamental values which underlay the entire Convention 
and form the rationale for Article 17, the Commission made reference to the Pre-
amble and the pledge to maintain an “eﬀ ective political democracy”. Thereafter 
and until the end of its existence, the Commission, without exception, repeated 
the formula it used in the Kühnen case, always in order to reject a complaint al-
leging that certain restrictions violated the Convention. This is reﬂ ected in the 
following cases upholding sanctions: 
a) B.H., M.W., H.P. and G.K v. Austria – involving the activities of groups 
inspired by the ideology of national socialism, preparing publications 
negating the existence of the Holocaust, employing political programs 
based on racial discrimination, questioning the existence of the ‘Austrian 
people’, and propagating the idea of a single German nation;111
b) F.P. v. Germany – involving propagation of the thesis that the Holocaust was 
a communist and Zionist conspiracy aimed at discrediting Germany;112
c) Hennicke v. Germany – involving distribution of brochures with verses 
glorifying the “higher race” and comparing foreigners to lice and propa-
gating the view that there would be no peace on earth so long as power 
is in the hands of the Jews;113
d) Honsik v. Austria – involving the issuance and distribution of publications 
negating the existence of gas chambers in concentration camps;114
e) Marais v. France – involving negation of the existence of gas chambers in 
concentration camps;115
de l’homme face au négationnisme, RTDH 2004, p. 657. See also G. Cohen–Jonathan, Le droit 
de l’homme à la non–discrimination raciale, RTDH 2001, pp. 667-668; P. Wachmann, La 
jurisprudence récente de la Commission européenne des droits de l’homme en matière de néga-
tionnisme, in: J.-F. Flauss. M. de Silvia (eds.), La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: 
développemets recents et nouveaux déﬁ s, Bruylant, Bruxelles: 1997.
110  Application no. 12194/86, decision of 12 May 1988, DR v. 56, p. 210. The com-
plainant was an activist in a group seeking to restore the NSDAP and the author of a number 
of publications.
111  Application no. 12774/87, decision of 12 October 1989, DR v. 62, p. 221.
112   Application no. 19459/92, decision of 29 March 1993 (unpubl.).
113   Application no. 34889/97, decision of May 1997 (unpubl.).
114   Application no. 25062/94, decision of 18 October 1995, DR 83-B, p. 77.
115   Application no. 31159/96, decision of 24 June 1996 (plenary session), DR 86-B, 
p. 184.
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f) Nachtmann v. Austria – involving negation of the existence of gas cham-
bers and questioning the number of victims of Nazi atrocities, particu-
larly among Jews;116
g) Oschsensberger v. Austria – involving the editing, issuance, and distribu-
tion of letters with anti-Semitic and racist texts;117
h) Rebhandl v. Austria – involving the distribution of a letter negating the 
illegality of the Anschluss and questioning the existence of Austrians as 
a people and the number of victims of Nazism;118
i) Remer v. Germany – involving the publication of a letter negating the 
existence of gas chambers in concentration camps (calling it a “Jewish 
falsehood” aimed at defrauding the Germans of money) and criticising 
immigration policies for “destroying Germany”, suggesting that the au-
thorities prefer to grant asylum to gypsies and drug dealers;119
j) Walendy v. Germany – negating the existence of Nazi victims.120
X. Before the entry into force of Protocol no. 11 (1 November 1998), only those 
cases which were found admissible by the Commission could be placed on the 
Court’s docket. As was indicated above, the application of Article 17 in casu acted 
like a sieve, leading to the acceptance of national interference as well as its charac-
ter and extent (proportionality). As a result cases involving Article 17 were rarely 
placed on the case-list of the Court, and if so they accompanied other issues. In 
order for such a case to reach the Court, the Commission had to reject a State’s 
argument that a particular restriction be looked at in light of Article 17 and dis-
tinguish the case before it – for various reasons – from “classic” activities contrary 
to the fundamental values of the Convention. As a result, the “old Court” tackled 
issues relating to Article 17 on only three occasions, always sitting as a Grand 
Chamber. None of the cases, however, concerned speech/expressions in praise of 
Nazism or negating the existence of Nazi crimes.121 
116  Application no. 36773/97, decision of 9 September 1998 (unpubl.).
117  Application no. 21318/93, decision of 2 September 1994 (unpubl.).
118  Application no. 24398/94, decision of 16 January 1996 (unpubl.).
119  Application no. 25096/94, decision of 6 September 1995, DR 82-B, p. 117.
120  Application no. 21128/93, decision of 11 January 1995, DR 80-A, p. 94.
121  Judgements: Jersild v. Denmark, application no. 15890/89, judgement of 23 Sep-
tember 1994, Series A. 298; Vogt v. Germany, application no. 17851/91, judgement of 26 
September 1995, Series A. 323; Lehideux and Isorni v. France, application no. 24662/94, 
judgement of 23 September 1998, RJD 1998-VII.
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After 1 November 1998, the Court became authorised to decide itself which 
complaints it would accept for review as admissible. As a result, the judges had 
to confront Article 17 directly and could no longer avoid interpretation of its 
provisions.
In its early decisions, the Court appeared to accept the legal reasoning of 
the Commission’s line of decisions beginning with the Kühnen case: Article 17 is 
used to determine the necessity for State intervention (restrictions) analysed in 
the context of Article 10. Such was the Court’s reasoning in the cases of Witzsch 
v. Germany (involving the negation of Nazi crimes in letters sent to Bavarian poli-
ticians)122 and Schimanek v. Austria (involving the activities of neo-Nazi groups, 
the organisation of meetings glorifying the Third Reich and its leaders, the SS and 
SA, and negation of the existence of gas chambers in concentration camps).123
In the latter case, the Court approved a 15-year prison sentence – an actually stiﬀ  
punishment – as necessary and proportional. In the case of R.L. v. Switzerland, 
concerning the conﬁ scation of packages containing CDs with Nazi contents, the 
judges applied the provisions of Article 10 – without reference to Article 17 – 
to ﬁ nd that the materials conﬁ scated were in conﬂ ict with the basic values under-
lying the Convention.124 
The change in the Court’s reasoning, and its choice of Article 17 as ratio-
nale, occurred in the case of Garaudy v. France.125 In that case, the complainant, 
formerly one of the “intellectual leaders” of the French communist left, underwent
a radical change of view in the 1990s. Following his conversion to Islam, Garaudy 
became a radical critic of the Jews and Israel. He did not limit himself to criti-
cism alone – in his published works he called into question what he termed as the 
“Nuremberg myth”, the “Holocaust myth”, and the “founding myth of the State 
of Israel”. The French courts determined that several of Garaudy’s books consti-
tuted the negation of war crimes and incitement to racial hatred. In reviewing the 
sanctions imposed, the Court relied on Article 17. It declared that negation of the 
crimes committed against the Jews during the Second World War was in contra-
diction to the fundamental values of the Convention expressed in the Preamble 
(justice and peace). As a result the complaint was inadmissible ratione materiae. 
122   Application no. 41448/98, decision of 20 April 1999 (unpubl.).
123  Application no. 32307/96, decision of 1 February 2000 (unpubl.).
124  Application no. 43874/98, decision of 25 November 2003 (unpubl.).
125  Application no. 65831/01, decision of 24 June 2003, ECHR 2003-IX.
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Thus, the Court returned to the theory of the “normative guillotine”,126 which it 
used as well in several later cases.127 
The guillotine theory is based on a “dichotomic logic”. Qualifying a parti-
cular expression as encompassed by the provisions of Article 17 (placing it outside
the protections of the Convention), results that the Court loses ratione materiae 
competence. Thus, the key element is the delineation of the area to which Article 
17 is applied, or in other words its scope of application. Not only are the Courts 
decisions far from precise on this question, but the judges appear to consciously 
avoid giving a clear answer. Already in the Garaudy case the Court backed away 
from giving an unequivocal classiﬁ cation of the statements regarding Israel, which 
were not limited to criticism of the State’s policies but had an “a proven racist 
aim” (un objectif raciste avéré). Despite the clear implication of the Court’s dictum, 
this did not lead to the application of Article 17. Instead, the judges found it un-
necessary to resolve the question of the application of Article 17 as the complaint 
was manifestly ill-founded on the basis of paragraph 2 of Article 10. 
In practice, the Court is thus seeking to retain its competence by carefully 
deﬁ ning the areas to which Article 17 is unquestionably applicable. In addition, 
the judges are creating a certain normative “grey area”. Although the Court could 
use the facts in the cases before it to create a set of concrete conditions or prereq-
uisites which would trigger the application of Article 17, it prefers to analyse the 
cases in light of Article 10 alone.128 It seems clear only that speech or expressions 
glorifying Nazism or negating Nazi war crimes will not be located in the “grey 
area” of Article 17. 
126  A consistent supporter of this use of Article 17 is the renowned French expert on 
the Convention, Gérard Cohen−Jonathan. He writes that the earlier “weakened” interpre-
tation of Article 17 probably arose from the fear of the Strasbourg judges that reliance on 
the guillotine theory would have provoked sharp criticism by “integralists of free speech” 
(Cohen−Jonathan, supra note 110, p. 680).
127 Norwood v. United Kingdom, application no. 23131/03, decision of 16 Novem-
ber 2004, ECHR 2004-XI (a ﬁ ne levied against an activist of the British National Party for 
hanging a poster with the text: Islam get out of Great Britain. Defend the British nation.); 
W.P. and others v. Poland, application no. 42264/98, decision of 2 September 2004, ECHR 
2004-VII (refusal to register an organisation with the name: the National Patriotic Associa-
tion of Victims of Bolshevism and Zionism); and Ivanov v. Russia, application no. 35222/04, 
decision of 20 February 2007, to be published in ECHR (distribution of a newsletter of an 
anti-Semitic character which called for the exclusion of Jews from public life because they 
incite the exploitation of other people).
128  As does M. Oetheimer, who writes that while the Court should not apply Article 
10 to expressions which clearly fall within the purview of Article 17, in cases of doubt Arti-
cle 10 should be applied (La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme face au discours de haine, 
RTDH 2007, vol. 69, p. 65). 
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The recent Court case of Vajnai v. Hungary129 also seems to leave little pos-
sibility that the protections of the Convention will be given to expressions based 
on the use of Nazi symbols. In that case, the complainant was the vice-president of 
the legally existing Hungarian Labour Party, who was found guilty of wearing, dur-
ing a march, a ﬁ ve-pronged red star, which according to Hungarian criminal law 
is a prohibited “totalitarian symbol”.130 In its unanimous judgement, the Court 
declared that the star was used “exclusively as a symbol of the legally existing leftist 
political group.” The provisions of Article 17 could not be applied to such a case. 
In reaching their decision, the Strasbourg judges demanded that the na-
tional courts establish with precision what content was connected in the particu-
lar case with the use of the symbol. It was assumed that the red star could have 
many meanings and create many feelings. Besides its symbolic meaning as “repre-
sentative of totalitarian communist governments,” it was also possible to associate 
it with the “international workers” movement, struggling for a fairer society, 
as well as other legally functioning political groups (para. 52). The complainants 
did not express views oﬀ ensive to the victims of totalitarian regimes nor belong to 
an organisations having “totalitarian ambitions” (para. 25). 
Even though the Court distinguished between the “good” and “evil” sym-
bolism connected with the red star and demanded that the national court iden-
tify the particular meaning to which Vajnai appealed, it seems certain that the 
Strasbourg judges would not ﬁ nd any similar polysemic character in the political 
aﬃ  rmative usage of Nazi (fascist) symbols. With regard to fascist ideology, the 
Court has followed a permanent, consistent, and critical attitude, not admitting of 
any distinction between “good” and “bad” usage. As a consequence, the Court’s 
oversight and control over State restrictions on Nazi expressions and activities is 
especially limited (or simply the Court applies the “guillotine” of Article 17).131 
Appearance of at least one of these circumstances must change the character of 
the expression. In a later part of its analysis – now based on Article 10 of the Con-
129  Application no. 33629/06, judgement of 8 July 2008, to be published in ECHR.
130  Paragraph 269/B of the Hungarian Criminal Code forbids the dissemination, use 
in public places, and exhibition of ﬁ ve totalitarian symbols: the swastika, the SS-badge, the 
arrow-cross, (sign of the nationalist and anti-Semitic group founded in 1935 by Ferenc Szála-
si), the symbol of sickle and hammer, and the red star. 
131   The Court makes this distinction between Nazi and Communist activities and 
expressions even whenever the latter is connected with membership in a group with an un-
democratic political program; an approach criticised in my monograph Ograniczenia swobody 
wypowiedzi w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w Strasburgu. Analiza 
krytyczna [Restrictions of freedom of expression in the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. A critical analysis], Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warszawa: 2010, pp. 569-570. 
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vention and leading the Court to a unanimous verdict ﬁ nding a violation of the 
Convention – the Strasbourg judges stressed the multi-dimensional character of 
the red star symbol and the need to take into consideration the context in which 
it was used (paras. 52-58). A contrario, however, other totalitarian symbols, with 
an unequivocal political meaning, would be treated diﬀ erently.
XI. Another area of complaints to the Strasbourg institutions has concerned restric-
tions placed on speech/expression concerning the debate over various historical 
events from World War II. Very often such expressions were elements of controver-
sial discussions concerning events which continue to stir strong emotions in various 
national histories, or which question conventionally accepted or “oﬃ  cial” versions. 
 As regards historical debates over national histories, one can observe an in-
teresting dichotomy in Strasbourg jurisprudence. On one hand, such discussions 
certainly qualify as “matters of public interest” (questions d’intérêt général).132 
In such cases – similar as with political debates – national authorities have only 
very limited discretionary powers, called margin of appreciation, and the Court 
will exercise strict supervision and carry out a rigorous and detailed assessment 
of any interventions or restrictions. But on the other hand, when the debate con-
cerns the history of a concrete nation, it is the national courts (judges), who know 
the place, circumstances, and context of historical events – surely much better 
than international judges – and would seem best equipped to assess the need for 
and extent of permissible restrictions on the freedom of expression.133 Hence 
the characterisation of a debate about events in a country’s history as a “matter 
of public interest” does not undermine the “national character” of the debate, 
nor would it seem to justify replacing national assessments on the need to curtail 
expression by a “European measure.” 
The Strasbourg institutions grappled with the issue of European oversight 
of national restrictions on historical debates for the ﬁ rst time in the case of Lehi-
deux and Isorni v. France.134 The legal issues turned out to be so complicated that 
the Commission issued its decision as a plenary body,135 and the ECHR heard the 
case in Grand Chamber. 
132  In the case of Monnat v. Switzerland, the Court labelled the discussion concern-
ing the actions of the Swiss government during World War II as an “extremely important” 
(la plus sérieuse) issue − application no. 73604/01, judgement of 21 September 2006, ECHR 
2006−X, para. 59.
133  So it was found in Vajnai v. Hungary, para. 48.
134  Application no. 24662/94, judgement of 23 September 1998, RJD 1998-VII. 
135  It will be recalled that the Commission reviewed the admissibility of applications 
until the entry into force of Protocol no. 11 (1 November 1998), which reformed the Stras-
bourg intake procedures. 
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The case concerned criminal proceedings in France against the complain-
ants for preparing and publishing a full-page advertisement in the national daily 
“Le Monde” on behalf of two associations which were seeking the rehabilitation 
of Marshal Pétain. The authors of the advertisement presented the main facts of 
the Marshal’s life in a positive light, asking the readers rhetorically if they recalled 
them. In the period between 1940-1945, it was written that Pétain, following the 
defeat by Germany, was asked to take over the reins of power, and that he achieved 
a cease-ﬁ re, staved oﬀ  German annexation of France’s Mediterranean regions, 
saved two million prisoners of war, and protected the country from Nazi barbarism 
and atrocities. Thanks to his political talent the Marshal managed to maintain 
a balance between fascist Germany and the Allied governments, and on the same 
day he met with Hitler in Montoire he sent representatives to make contact with 
the Allies. His secret agreement with the Americans was aimed at liberating France 
and preparing the French army in Africa for that task. According to the authors, 
the grey-haired, ninety-year old man was sentenced after a short, pre-determined 
and ﬁ xed legal proceeding. 
Ultimately, the complainants were sentenced in a lower court to pay dam-
ages in the symbolic amount of one franc, and to publish a fragment of the judge-
ment in “Le Monde”.136 The Cassation Court sentenced them – as it publicly ex-
plained – for their “hidden apology” which, “in an implicit but necessary fashion” 
white-washed war crimes. Thus, the guilt of the complainants was based more on 
what they did not write than the content of the advertisement. The French Court 
found that the advertisement overlooked the unsavoury side of Pétain’s life, in 
particular his responsibility for the deportation of French Jews. The complainants 
instead referred cleverly to the so-called “double game theory”, a theory rejected 
by historians. 
Both the Commission (by a vote of 23-8) and the Court (by a vote of 15-6) 
found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The French authorities stressed 
in their legal memoranda that in cases concerning restrictions on discussions of 
national history, the local authorities of the State are better placed to assess the 
situation for two reasons. The ﬁ rst may be called a common historical argument 
– that the competence of local authorities to assess historical events in their own 
country is greater than that of international judges. The second reason, taking the 
form of a highly developed historical argument, is that the expression concerned 
136  Actually the prosecution recommended suspension of the proceedings, but the 
judge refused to agree and sent the complaint to court. In the ﬁ rst instance the defendants 
were acquitted. This acquittal, however, was challenged by a combatant organisation and 
reversed by the appellate court. 
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very sensitive and still emotional events. The State’s intervention – in addition 
to protecting public order and preventing crimes – was also aimed at protecting 
the rights of third persons, in particular, their deep sensitivities. Thus, argued the 
French authorities, the Strasbourg institutions should be guided in their review of 
the case by their analogous decisions concerning the protection of moral convic-
tions or religious beliefs.137 
Both Strasbourg institutions focused primarily on the “technique” used in 
the announcement and questioned by the French courts. In describing Pétain’s 
policies as “skilful to the highest degree” the authors were clearly referring to the 
double game theory. They had to know that this theory has been rejected by most 
historians, both French and non-French. The Court went on, however, to state 
it could not issue an assessment of a matter which is still the object of research 
and subject to ongoing interpretation. In the Court’s opinion, it was not dealing 
with established historical facts such as the Holocaust, the negation or revision of 
which is not, in light of Article 17, protected by Article 10. The authors’ asser-
tions could not be classiﬁ ed as the denial of events, which they themselves char-
acterised as “German omnipotence and barbarianism” and “Nazi atrocities and 
persecutions”. At the most, the authors’ assertions can be interpreted as support 
for one of the theories proﬀ ered in assessing the role of the Chief of the Vichy 
government (paras. 47-48 of the Court’s judgement).
The reason for sentencing the complainants was therefore likely to be the 
second “technique” used by the French court, ﬁ nding them guilty of an “act of 
omission”. The announcement presented Pétain wholly in a positive light and 
completely overlooked the charges made against him which led to him receiving a 
death sentence. The manner of presentation was highly polemical. But the Court 
found that Article 10 does not protect only the content of information or ideas 
expressed, but also the form in which they are expressed. 
The authors of the publication were sentenced mainly because they did not 
distance themselves from speciﬁ c aspects of Petain’s activities, such as adoption 
of legal acts against Jewish population. This law allowed France to detain Jaws 
and to send them to concentration camps. Neither aﬃ  rmation of fascism nor 
questioning of other basic values of the Convention is protected by Article 10. 
137  In the ﬁ rst case (protection of morals) the Court was guided by the judgement 
in the case of Handyside v. United Kingdom (application no. 5493/72, judgement of 7 De-
cember 1976 (plenary session), Series A. 24); and in the second case the reasoning of Otto 
Preminger v. Austria (application no. 13470/87, judgement of 20 September 1994, Series 
A. 295–A) and Wingrove v. United Kingdom (application no. 17419/90, judgement of 25 
November 1996, RJD 1996-V) was applied. 
Ireneusz C. Kamiński
57
In this case, the authors openly expressed their negative opinion about Nazi crimes 
and persecution of Jews. The advertisement did not, however, mention that Petain 
through its actions and inactions consciously attributed to those crimes. Although 
it is morally reprehensible, silence about those issues in the text of the article, has 
to be assessed in the light of other circumstances of the case. These included the 
fact that the prosecution, whose role it was to represent all the sensibilities which 
make up the general interest and to assess the rights of others, ﬁ rst decided not 
to proceed with the case against the applicants in the criminal court, then re-
frained from appealing against the acquittal pronounced by that court. The 
Court further noted that the events referred to in the publication in issue had 
occurred more than forty years before. Even though the complainants’ remarks 
were likely to reopen the controversy and bring back memories of past suﬀ erings, 
the lapse of time made it inappropriate to deal with such remarks, forty years on, 
with the same severity as ten or twenty years after the war. However diﬃ  cult and 
painful the debate, it should take place in an open manner, without pre-conditions 
or prejudices (para. 55). 
Being aware and taking into account the ongoing emotional nature of the 
discussion in France over its war past, the Court performed a “Europeanisation” of 
the discussion, subjecting it to objective rules and principles and rigorous control. 
Adopting the Commission’s ﬁ nding that there was no “urgent social need” for 
intervention (para. 67); the Court examined the intervention itself and not only 
the concrete sanctions applied (which were in fact minimal). Here, the Court’s 
verdict seems to be based on a weaker thesis. It found the use of criminal proceed-
ings when other, civil remedies, were available to be disproportional (para. 57). 
Regardless of their diﬀ erences in other aspects, both Strasbourg institutions ques-
tioned the use of criminal proceedings, ignoring the fact that the sanctions applied 
were minimal, even just symbolic. 
The case of Lehideux and Isorni is a special and particular case inasmuch as 
the reason for State interference into the freedom of expression was the white-
washing of history by the omission of certain historical facts and reference to inter-
pretative theories rejected by most experts. In most instances, however, the reasons 
for State interference into freedom of expression are not based on the omission of 
issues or facts, but on their being presented in a false, negative or oﬀ ensive way. 
Such was the case in Monnat v. Switzerland.138 In a television program 
titled “The Lost Honour of Switzerland,” a popular view – sometimes referred to 
as a carefully cultivated national myth – was criticised and attacked. This view 
holds that during the Second World War the Swiss authorities and inhabitants 
138  Application no. 73604/01, judgement of 21 September 2006, ECHR 2006−X.
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behaved courageously against the German fascists. The authors of the program 
asserted that the truth was quite diﬀ erent, and that it was possible even to speak 
of a sympathy for fascism, which grew out of the similarities in views between the 
fascists and the Swiss governing elite. In this regard, the authors of the program 
mentioned Swiss anti-Semitism, the laundering of German money, and the highly 
developed trade relations between Switzerland and Nazi Germany. 
Following the program’s emission, a protest was lodged by a group of view-
ers to an independent governmental commission handling radio and television 
complaints, arguing that the program lacked objectivity. The commission agreed 
with the accusation, ﬁ nding that the program presented only one point of view 
and failed to separate fact from opinion. The television authorities overseeing 
programming were directed to take steps to prevent any further emission of the 
program or its distribution. The Commission’s decision was upheld by the Swiss 
Federal Court, which declared in its judgement that although the “engagement 
of journalists” is not forbidden, viewers should have been informed that the pro-
gram was not presenting “unquestioned facts” but only one interpretation of the 
relations between Switzerland and Nazi Germany. As a result of the Court’s deci-
sion, copies of the program could not be sold within Switzerland or abroad.
The Strasbourg Court took note of the emotions involved in the discussion 
of Switzerland’s behaviour during World War II and the divided public opinion. 
But that didn’t change the fact that the debate concerned issues of exceptional 
public importance, and in such cases the State’s margin of appreciation is virtu-
ally nil. While the Court acknowledged the justiﬁ cation for the State’s action, 
i.e. the desire to assure that viewers obtain objective and clear information (pro-
tection of the rights of third persons), it found that such an aim had to be con-
fronted with the circumstances surrounding the discussion of the historical issue 
in question, where it is impossible to attain certainty (para. 63) and ﬁ fty years 
have elapsed since the events (para. 64). As a result, the Strasbourg judges unan-
imously declared that Switzerland had violated Article 10 of the Convention, 
and that the sanctions it imposed constituted a form of censorship and would 
discourage Monnat from undertaking any such similar criticism in the future. 
It should be emphasised that the Court identiﬁ ed the national sanctions applied 
as a restriction on all journalists, not just on the individual complainant, fright-
ening journalists as a whole away from presenting positions on controversial 
matters of public importance, thus diminishing their role as a public watchdog 
(chien de garde) (para. 70). 
Thus, the Court acknowledged the fundamental signiﬁ cance of a free and 
public debate on national historical issues where attainment of factual certain-
ty is impossible, and the need to allow for the presentation of various views and 
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hypotheses.139 The imposition of a rigorous objectivism can be justiﬁ ed, if at all, 
primarily in cases where the historical debate concerns living persons, whose per-
sonal rights come into play.140 However, even in such cases intervention by the 
State must be precisely justiﬁ ed, taking into account the conﬂ icting opinions 
of various parties. It would be easier to convince the Court of the need for such 
intervention in the case of “oﬀ ensive hypotheses” directed toward speciﬁ c persons 
combined with the omission of known facts and available source materials.141 
The role of the “elapse of time” needs to be noted inasmuch as this formula-
tion was used by the Court in both the French and Swiss cases.142 A signiﬁ cant time 
gap between the debate and the underlying events brings about a “re-orientation” 
of the State’s margin of appreciation. Broad discretionary powers, when the debate 
is of an actual character, become narrow with the passage of time. 
A similar rigorous approach to State intervention may occur when events 
surrounding World War II are used, in various ways, to criticise persons holding po-
litical oﬃ  ce or fulﬁ lling public functions. In such cases, the key test applied by the 
Court is whether the criticism involves an element of political discussion around 
issues of general public signiﬁ cance. If so, then State intervention in individual 
expressions is treated as having signiﬁ cant repercussions upon freedom of speech 
and public debate in the given country. For this reason, the Strasbourg judges have 
found violations of the Convention even in instances where the national courts 
imposed light sanctions upon nettlesome and ﬁ ery speech. In matters considered 
by the Court as public debate, open criticism is permissible even if it has minimal 
139  The methodology for reaching an assumption of uncertainty in discussions con-
cerning historical events, which brings with it a tolerance of minority viewpoints, even if they 
are shocking or extravagant, seems to be a fundamental reconstruction of the Strasbourg 
standard. The Court (and national courts) are not supposed to act as arbiters in such contro-
versies. In this context see also Giniewski v. France, application no. 64016/00, judgement of 
31 January 2006, ECHR 2006−I, para. 51-52.
140  This distinction was emphasised by the judges in the case of Chauvy and Others 
v. France, application no. 64915/01, judgement of 29 June 2004, ECHR 2004−VI, para. 69. 
In the Monnat judgement the Court, when analysing the conﬂ ict of interests, drew attention 
to the fact that none of the still-living politicians (or the next-of-kin of deceased politicians) 
who were mentioned in the program commenced any actions relating to damage to their 
reputations or good name (para. 62). As regards the rights of other persons (the remaining 
viewers) the Court found that commencement of complaints by them following emission of 
the program would not be a sufﬁ cient excuse for the institution of unwarranted restrictions 
on freedom of expression (para. 63). 
141  Chauvy and others v. France, para. 73.
142  Para. 55 of the judgement in Lehideux and Isorni, para. 64 of the judgement in 
Monnat.
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factual support. For example, the Court has found violations of Article 10 of the 
Convention in the following cases: 
 a) Oberschlick v. Ausria (no. 1) – involving the publication by a journalist 
of information submitted by himself to the prosecutor’s oﬃ  ce, alleging 
that a politician committed the crime of carrying out forbidden neo-
Nazi activities by proposing that diﬀ erent social beneﬁ ts be granted to 
Austrians and to foreigners;143
b) Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2) – involving the criticism by a journalist, 
using the words “fascist” and “idiot”, with respect to a politician for 
a statement arguing that all of the sides ﬁ ghting during World War II 
should be treated equally;144
c) Feldek v. Slovakia – involving an allegation that a politician has a “fascist 
past”, based on said politician’s membership, as a teenager during the war, 
in the organisation “Hlinka’s Youth”; when membership in the organisa-
tion was not connected with any active role in the war and the politician 
repeatedly explained that he joined as a result of his passion for sports.145
Contrary to the above line of cases, however, the Court has let stand State 
restrictions and the imposition of sanctions for emotional invectives stripped 
of any public interest or value.146
***
In three types of legal contexts, the European Court of Human Rights has 
established its jurisdiction over disputes concerning “historical situations” pre-
ceding the enactment of the Convention. The ﬁ rst group is composed of cases 
alleging a violation of the Convention due to the lack of eﬃ  cient investigation 
of death or maltreatment (torture). In these cases, the procedural obligation is 
treated by the Court as independent from the substantive obligation. The second 
group consists of cases that involve a continuing violation of a right under the 
Convention, usually the right to property. The third group encompasses those 
cases that refer to historical events and usually involve controversial speech. 
Although the rationale for the Court’s competence diﬀ ers among these three 
groups, the Court has developed interesting case law.
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